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THE RIGHT CHOICE FOR ELECTIONS: HOW CHOICE
VOTING WILL END GERRYMANDERING AND EXPAND
MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS, FROM CITY COUNCILS
TO CONGRESS
Rob Richie *
Andrew Spencer **
"Every voice will be heard, every right will be seen, and every
wrong felt; and then the House of Representatives will become
what the Framers of the Constitution intended it should be-a
bright and honest mirror, reflecting all the lights and shades of
the multifarious interests of this mighty people, as they lie spread
out over this broad land."
-Senator Jacob W. Miller of New Jersey'
When the United States Congress first imposed single-member
congressional districts on the states in 1842, it had the loftiest of
intentions. The several states that at the time elected U.S. House
Representatives on a statewide, at-large basis often had only one
party win seats due to winner-take-all election rules.' Proponents
argued that single-member districts would ensure fair represen-
tation of every viewpoint, majority or minority, making Congress
a "mirror of the people."' Experience has since proven their hopes
misguided.4
• Executive Director, FairVote. B.A., 1987, Haverford College.
** Legal Fellow, FairVote. J.D., 2012, University of Arizona School of Law; B.S., B.A.,
2006, University of Arizona.
1. CONG. GLOBE, 27TH CONG., 2D SESS. app. at 790 (1842) (speaking in favor of a
mandate for single-member congressional districts).
2. See Nicolas Flores, A History of One-Winner Districts for Congress ch. 3 (un-
published thesis, Stanford University) (citing ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE:
REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1850, at 126, 154-57 (1987)), available at
http:/www.fairvote.orgllibraryfhistory/flores/apportn.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
3. Id.
4. Cf. The Untouchables, FAIVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/index.php?page=l904
(last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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Instead, congressional elections have been characterized by
largely uncompetitive races, distortions in partisan representa-
tion, declines in centrist representatives able to advance compro-
mise, and low levels of representation for women and racial mi-
norities.5 Such outcomes are not inevitable, but rather are a
direct product of winner-take-all, single-member district elections
that have a long history of resulting in noncompetitive elections
and-even if not as problematic as at-large, winner-take-all elec-
tions--distortions in representation. Despite such problems and
the U.S. Constitution's silence on methods of election, federal law
continues to treat the single-member district system as the pre-
ferred method for electing candidates at all levels of government,
with legislators and judges seemingly still hypnotized by the
failed promise of Senator Miller's vision in 1842. 7 For congres-
sional elections, federal law since 1967 has blocked states from
even considering any other method for congressional elections.' At
the state and local level, judges routinely order creation of single-
member, winner-take-all districts as the judicially preferred rem-
edy to violations of the Voting Rights Act despite evidence of the
shortcomings of these districts. 9
This article recommends a different approach, grounded in re-
placing winner-take-all voting rules with choice voting,0 both as a
generally applied voting method and as a preferred remedy in
Voting Rights Act cases. In Section I, it reviews the major winner-
take-all methods for electing legislative candidates, both at-large
and by district. It places these methods in historical and legal
5. See infra Sections I.B., I.C.
6. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 121 (1994).
7. See Pub. L. No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006)); supra notes
1-4 and accompanying text.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Dillard v. Baldwin Cnty. Comm'n, 833 So. 2d 11, 13-14, 18 (Ala. 2002);
Hickel v. Se. Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 70 (Ala. 1992); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 263 S.E.2d
377, 397 (N.C. 2002); see also infra Section I.B.
10. What we refer to as "choice voting" throughout this article is a method of voting in
multi-member districts that has alternatively been referred to as "preference voting," "sin-
gle transferable vote," or by reference to one particular tabulation method, such as the
"Hare system." See Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alter-
native Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 341-
42 (1998) (describing "preference voting"); Single Transferable Vote, ELECTORAL REFORM
SOC'Y, http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/single-transferable-vote/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2013) (describing "single transferable vote"); Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 30, 38
(1937) (describing the "Hare system").
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context, and critiques them based on their policy implications for
voters and candidates. In Section II, it provides the same for mod-
ified, non-winner-take-all methods of electing candidates and
demonstrates that choice voting in multi-member districts pro-
vides voters with greater choice and more representative legisla-
tive bodies. In Section III, it addresses choice voting as a remedy
in Voting Rights Act cases and argues not only that it is legal un-
der both the Federal Voting Rights Act and the California Voting
Rights Act, but also that it often would effectuate the policies of
those Acts better than single-member districts. Section IV will
demonstrate how choice voting can and should be implemented
for electing legislative bodies more generally, how it is fully con-
stitutional, and how it can be implemented with relatively modest
changes to legislative districts that are fully consistent with
American political traditions. Finally, this article concludes by
appealing to courts and legislatures to look to choice voting as a
model for how to create a fairer and more representative republi-
can form of government at every jurisdictional level.
I. WINNER-TAKE-ALL
The term winner-take-all refers to an election system in which
the candidate or party with the most support becomes the exclu-
sive winner of the election, such that any other candidate or party
gains no representation at all, no matter how substantial its
share of the vote.1 All elections with a single winner, such as a
governor or mayor's race, are necessarily winner-take-all; howev-
er, elections for multi-member bodies, such as a state legislature
or city council or school board, may or may not be winner-take-all
depending on how the jurisdiction conducts its elections. This sec-
tion reviews, compares, and critiques the most common winner-
take-all methods for electing legislative bodies: (1) winner-take-
all, at-large and multi-member elections and (2) winner-take-all,
single-member district elections.
11. See GUINIER, supra note 6, at 11-12; Winner-Take-All Systems, FAIRVOTE, http:
Harchive.fairvote.orgl?page=568 (last visited, Feb. 18, 2013).
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A. Winner-Take-All, At-Large Elections
An at-large election is one in which every voter in the jurisdic-
tion can vote for any of the candidates."2 For example, some
smaller city councils consist of five council members elected under
a general ticket system, in which all candidates for those five
seats appear on the ballot together, voters citywide may cast one
vote each for up to five candidates, and the five candidates with
the most votes are elected. 3 Other cities use numbered posts, in
which candidates must run for one specific city council position;"'
as long as every voter in the city may vote for every such position,
this is also an at-large election.15
The general ticket and numbered post systems are winner-
take-all elections. 6 To illustrate this point, consider a city with a
five-seat city council in which 60% of voters generally prefer
Democratic candidates and 40% generally prefer Republican can-
didates. A fair reflection of these preferences would be three
Democrats and two Republicans. However, in an at-large, winner-
take-all election, the five Democratic candidates will each receive
about 60% of the vote and the five Republicans each about 40%.
As a result, Democrats will win all five seats and represent eve-
ryone, including the 40% of the city's voters who prefer Republi-
cans. These voters are effectively left with no voice on the city
council.
In places with racially polarized voting, the power of electoral
majorities to shut out voters in the minority can allow those can-
12. See Michael E. Lewyn, When Is Cumulative Voting Preferable to Single-Member
Districting?, 25 N.M. L. REV. 197, 198 (1995); At-large Election Systems, FAIRVOTE, http://
archive.fairvote.org/?page=766 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
13. A number of towns in California use this system, such as Arcadia and San Gabri-
el. ARCADIA, CAL. CITY CHARTER art. IV, § 400 (1998), available at http://www.ci.arc
adia.ca.us/docs/170456102008city-charter.pdf; see City Council, CITY OF SAN GABRIEL,
CAL., http://www.sangabrielcity.com/index.aspx?nid=87 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
14. See Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out: A Remedial Road Map for the Use of
Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1867, 1919-
20 (1998).
15. See Lewyn, supra note 12, at 198; Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1920. Often, the num-
bered posts are tied to geographic districts, so that candidates are elected at-large, but
each must reside in a different district. Alhambra, California elects its city council this
way. Alhambra City Council, CITY OF ALHAMBRA, http://www.cityofalhambra.org/govern
ment/city-council/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
16. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 337.
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didates preferred by the white majority to win 100% of the seats,
despite a substantial number of racial minorities preferring other
candidates. 7 Such outcomes make a mockery of the principle of
one person, one vote; 8 while every voter has the same number of
votes, voters in the majority have five votes that each help elect a
candidate, while voters in the minority can elect none.
1. Early History of Use in Congressional Elections
When Congress was first established, the states used a variety
of creative methods for electing their representatives. 9 From the
second Congress until 1842, most states with large populations
used single-member districts, while those with smaller popula-
tions often elected their congressional representatives by general
ticket." Some states had a majority requirement, requiring re-
peated elections until one in which the top voter-getter earned
more than half the votes." All such elections were winner-take-
all, as alternative methods had not yet been devised,22and they
took place over a two-year period, as Congress had yet to pass a
law establishing a single general election date.23
17. Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on
Minority Representation, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 338 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, eds., 1994)
[hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION].
18. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (holding that equality in voting re-
quires "one person, one vote").
19. For a colorful example of an early creative approach to congressional representa-
tion, consider the Massachusetts election from 1792: 'The voters of Districts One and Two
each could vote for four candidates, but the votes had to be distributed as follows: one vote
for a candidate from each of the three counties in the district and one additional vote for
any candidate from any part of the district. In the Third District each voter had two votes;
one had to be cast for a candidate from Barnstable, Dukes and Nantucket counties and the
other for a candidate from Bristol and Plymouth. In addition all voters in the above three
districts cast one additional vote for any candidate from anywhere in the three districts,
listed in the returns as at-large. Voters of the Fourth District had three votes, one for a
candidate from York, another from Cumberland and the other from any of the remaining
counties of this district." MICHAEL J. DUBIN, UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS,
1788-1997, at 9 n.7 (1998).
20. ZAGARRI, supra note 2, at 107-08; see Flores, supra note 2 (citing JOHN L. MOORE,
ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 943-74 (2001)).
21. DUBIN, supra note 19, at 126-32.
22. Flores, supra note 2 (citing MOORE, ET AL., supra note 20, at 943-74); Tory Mast,
The History of Single Member Districts for Congress, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org
/?page=526 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
23. See Act of Jan. 23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (1845).
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As parties developed and became dominant forces in elections,
the impact of voting rules became more clearly measurable.24 Not
surprisingly, the general ticket elections consistently resulted in
partisan sweeps, in which the entire delegation from a state
would come from a single political party.25 For example, when
New Jersey elected six U.S. House Representatives in 1830, the
National Republican party won all six seats with vote totals for
their candidates ranging from a low of 50.25% to a high of
52.86%.26 All six Democratic Party candidates lost, despite receiv-
ing as much as 49.38% of the vote. 7 In the 1839 election for the
26th Congress, Alabama used a single-member district system
and elected three Democrats and two Whig Party members." Pri-
or to the next congressional election, the Democrat-controlled Al-
abama legislature switched to the general ticket method, and in
1841 Alabama elected a solid slate of five Democrats.29 In U.S.
House elections over the course of 1840 and 1841, seven states
conducted congressional elections by general ticket, and all seven
elected single-party slates.0
After Alabama successfully shut out the minority Whig Party
by switching to a general ticket, Members of Congress became
concerned that other states would follow suit."' Representative
Garrett Davis of Kentucky noted that if large states began elect-
ing slates of candidates, as few as five states could control a ma-
jority of the U.S. House.32 This concern led to passage of the 1842
Apportionment Act, which included a clause mandating that
states only elect representatives from single-member districts.3
24. See ZAGARRI, supra note 2, at 126.
25. See id.
26. DUBIN, supra note 19, at 97.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 122.
29. Id. at 128.
30. Those seven were Georgia (nine Whigs), Missouri (two Democrats), New Jersey
(six Whigs), Alabama (five Democrats), Mississippi (two Democrats), New Hampshire (five
Democrats), and Rhode Island (two Whigs). Id. at 126-30.
31. Flores, supra note 2.
32. CONG. GLOBE, 27TH CONG., 2D SESS. 340 (1842) ("Under the proposed ratio, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, by adopting the general-ticket
system, would have the majority in this house."). Today, the congressional delegations
from the most populous nine states would constitute a majority of the House. Apportion-
ment Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), http://www.census.gov/2O0census/data/appor
tionment-data-text.php.
33. Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1842); Flores, supra note 2.
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The law was controversial, however, with President Tyler seeing
it as infringing on a power traditionally left to states. 4 Some
small states ignored the mandate, and Congress recognized their
representatives anyway.35 Nonetheless, 1842 marked the point at
which the general ticket method for congressional elections be-
came disfavored. The requirement came and went from federal
law, and by 1967, only Hawaii and New Mexico continued to elect
their representatives by general ticket.3
2. The Civil Rights Era
The lack of minority representation under winner-take-all, at-
large elections has always been seen as a problem for a republi-
can system of government. 7 However, this problem took on new
significance when it became apparent that the system could be
used-and was used-to deny representation to racial minori-
ties.38 After the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment which for-
bade states from denying the right to vote based on race, many
jurisdictions attempted to prevent racial minorities from gaining
the full benefits of suffrage.39
The first tactics against fair representation of African Ameri-
cans were the most overt: for example, terrorism by groups like
the Ku Klux Klan, as state governments looked the other way."
The federal government responded by enacting statutes such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ensuring that victims of race-based
violence would have recourse in federal court.41 Southern states
34. Emanuel Celler, Congressional Apportionment-Past, Present, and Future, 17
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 268, 272 (1952); Flores, supra note 2.
35. Flores, supra note 2.
36. Id. at ch. 4.
37. See generally ZAGARRI, supra note 2, at 127 (quoting early criticisms of winner-
take-all, at-large elections).
38. Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
39. See generally Emma C. Jordan, The Future of the Fifteenth Amendment, 28 HOw.
L.J. 541, 550-54 (1985) (describing the Supreme Court's early treatment of the Fifteenth
Amendment).
40. See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-12 (1966) (review-
ing the history of racial disenfranchisement following the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983) (describing the history of vio-
lence toward minorities leading to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
41. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (2006)).
2013]
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ultimately adopted so-called Jim Crow laws, such as poll taxes,
literacy tests, and grandfather clauses that put severe limits on
African American suffrage for decades." Many of these laws were
ultimately declared unconstitutional, 43 and the rest were finally
made illegal under federal law with the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA")."
Consequently, many southern jurisdictions began shifting to
elections by winner-take-all, at-large methods that would allow
racial minorities to cast a ballot, but deny them any reasonable
possibility of actually electing anyone. Immediately following the
passage of the VRA, for example, many local jurisdictions in
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Missis-
sippi switched to winner-take-all, at-large elections.45 In investi-
gating the causes of the 1967 riots, the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders found that winner-take-all, at-large
voting contributed to many black "ghetto residents" feeling un-
represented throughout many American cities: "[lt is clear that
at-large representation, currently the practice in many American
cities, does not give members of the minority community a feeling
of involvement or stake in city government. Further, this form of
representation dilutes the normal political impact of pressures
generated by a particular neighborhood or district." 6
42. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310-12.
43. See, e.g., id. at 311-12; Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1966)
(holding that Virginia's use of poll taxes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1915) (holding that
the Grandfather Clause exceptions to literacy tests violate the Fifteenth Amendment).
44. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).
45. See Orville Vernon Burton, et al., South Carolina, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra
note 17, at 191, 201 (noting that in the eight years after passage of the VRA, eleven of the
eighteen counties that previously used single-member districts switched to at-large elec-
tions); Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Racial
and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 17, at 21, 25 (noting that the
North Carolina legislature held a special session following passage of the VRA to author-
ize the use of at-large elections in counties and mandate their use in school board elec-
tions); Laughlin McDonald, et al., Georgia, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 17, at 67, 82
(noting that the thirteen counties with most significant black populations switched to at-
large elections after passage of the VRA); Frank R. Parker, et al., Mississippi, in QUIET
REVOLUTION, supra note 17, at 136, 138 (noting that twenty-two of the twenty-six largest
cities in Mississippi held at-large city council elections in 1965).
46. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 211 (1992).
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In the wake of these revelations, Congress imposed a federal
requirement that states use single-seat districts in 1967, in part
motivated by civil rights concerns to head off statewide winner-
take-all elections in the South.47 The Supreme Court in 1969
stepped in to declare that jurisdictions covered under section 5 of
the VRA ("Section 5") could not switch to winner-take-all, at-large
elections if doing so would dilute the votes of racial minorities."
In 1973, the Court went even further, holding that an electoral
system may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment if it denies racial minorities an equal oppor-
tunity "to participate in the political processes and to elect legis-
lators of their choice," as determined by a totality of
circumstances test.49 Following these cases, the courts became a
battleground for challenging winner-take-all electoral schemes. °
These options narrowed in 1980 when the Supreme Court de-
cided City of Mobile v. Bolden."1 In this case, a plurality of the
Court held that in order to establish a constitutional violation,
plaintiffs must not merely show minority vote dilution based on
the totality of circumstances; they must also prove intent to dis-
criminate.52 With the difficulty inherent in proving discriminatory
intent, litigation slowed.53 In 1982, however, Congress eliminated
the impact of Bolden by amending section 2 of the VRA ("Section
2") to make illegal any electoral system that results in discrimi-
nation, irrespective of intent.
5 4
Since the 1982 amendments, Section 2 has been the dominant
weapon for combating discriminatory use of winner-take-all, at-
47. See Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
48. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
49. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766, 769-70 (1973) (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971)).
50. Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 5 ("[Tihe amount of litigation skyrocketed after White
as a growing number of minority plaintiffs began to challenge electoral systems, chiefly at-
large and multimember schemes, that they claimed diluted the impact of their votes.").
51. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion).
52. Id. at 62-65.
53. Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 5 ("As a result, litigious challenges to delusionary elec-
toral schemes quickly dried up as plaintiffs soon realized how inhibiting this requirement
was.").
54. Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)). The legisla-
tive history describes the intent standard as "inordinately difficult" and "unnecessarily
divisive." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 36 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 214.
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large elections." Such systems are not per se illegal under the
VRA, as Section 2 only addresses the ability for racial minorities
to elect candidates of choice. 6 But to the extent a link can be
made between a jurisdiction's use of winner-take-all, at-large
elections and a lack of victories for preferred candidates of racial
minorities, federal courts have jurisdiction to order a change tai-
lored to remedy that lack of representation. 7
B. Winner-Take-All Districts
The most common remedy for a Section 2 violation premised on
winner-take-all, at-large electoral schemes is to replace them
with winner-take-all, single-member districts.58 Winner-take-all
districts are also the system that Congress ultimately foisted up-
on every state to prevent them from using winner-take-all, at-
large elections for their congressional representatives. 9 As a re-
sult, jurisdictions found to violate Section 2 have generally been
divided into single-member districts, providing racial minorities
with opportunities to elect preferred candidates through creation
of some number of majority-minority districts (districts drawn to
ensure that racial minority voters will be able to elect their pre-
ferred candidate).6 °
A district-based electoral system is any in which members of a
legislative body are elected by only some sub-section of the juris-
diction's voters based on where those voters reside.6' Districts
may be either multi-member or single-member."2 Single-member
districts elect only one representative.63 As single-member dis-
tricts only elect one person, they are necessarily winner-take-all
55. Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 5. There is also evidence that the amendment led to
jurisdictions switching away from winner-take-all, at-large, and multi-member districts
without any suit being brought in order to avoid litigation before it happened. Id.
56. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44, 48 (1986).
57. Id. at 48.
58. See Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1971) (citing Connor v. Johnson,
402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971)).
59. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006).
60. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 415 (2006); see
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 19 (1975).
61. Single Member Districts, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=765 (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2013).
62. See id. At-large Election Systems, FAIRVOTE, supra note 12.
63. See Single Member Districts, FAIRVOTE, supra note 61.
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in nature. Winner-take-all, multi-member district election sys-
tems elect two or more representatives from each district in a
method similar to the general ticket, at-large method; voters have
the same number of votes as seats and are restricted to giving one
vote per candidate.64 They are used today by several states to
elect state legislators and were used at one time by many addi-
tional states.65
Winner-take-all, multi-member district elections can generate
concerns about fair representation similar to those generated by
winner-take-all, at-large elections. Partisan elections from win-
ner-take-all, multi-member districts tend to result in sweeps sim-
ilar to at-large elections, preventing minority voices from within a
district from electing any members.66 For example, the New Jer-
sey state legislature consists of forty districts, each electing two
members of the assembly and one senator.67 After the 2011 elec-
tions, every single district was represented by two assembly
members of the same political party, with thirty-eight of those
districts having a senator of that same party.
Another example of extreme distortion in representation may
be found in the New Hampshire House of Representatives, which
elects many of its 400 members in winner-take-all, multi-member
districts that contain up to eleven representatives.69 Many of New
Hampshire's multi-member districts are represented by only one
64. See At-large Election Systems, FAIRVOTE, supra note 12.
65. E.g., ARiz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1 ('The house of representatives shall be com-
posed of two members elected from each of the thirty legislative districts established pur-
suant to this section.").
66. At-large Election Systems, FAIRVOTE, supra note 12.
67. NEW JERSEY CONST. art. 4, § 2. ('Two members of the General Assembly shall be
elected by the legally qualified voters of each Assembly district"); Our Legislature, N.J.
LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/our.asp Qast visited Feb. 18,
2013).
68. Compare Candidate Returns for General Assembly for November 2011 General
Election, ST. N.J. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.state.nj.us/state/elections/election-results/
2011-official-gen-elect-gen-assembly-results- 12141L.pdf, with Candidate Returns for State
Senate for November 2011 General Election, ST. N.J. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.state.nj.
us/state/elections/election-results/201 1-official-gen-elect-state-senate-results- 12141 1.pdf.
69. See NH House Roster Downloads, ST. N.H., http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/hou
se/members/rosterdownloads.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). The New Hampshire House
of Representatives is the fourth largest English-speaking legislative body in the world.
New Hampshire Almanac, NH.GOV, http://www.nh.gov/nhinfo/stgovt.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013).
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political party. ° For example, after the 2010 elections, the fourth
district in Rockingham elected thirteen representatives-all Re-
publican 7 -and in 2012, Republicans swept all nine seats in
Rockingham's eighth district."
Although partisan dominance clearly is possible in such elec-
tions, the use of multi-member districts does carry an interesting
advantage: a party may run a relatively diverse slate of candi-
dates to widen support for its ticket.73 This strategy affects nomi-
nation calculations, from presidential candidates' selection of
vice-presidential running mates to parties promoting a mix of
candidates for statewide offices being held at the same time. 4 In
legislative elections, studies show that women candidates both
run and win more often in multi-seat districts.75 Today, more than
half the population has a female representative in several states
with multi-seat legislative districts, including Arizona, Maryland,
New Jersey, and Washington.7 ' Even in the South, where racially
polarized voting is often the norm, there are instances in state
legislative elections-for example, in states like North Carolina
and Virginia in the 1980s-where Democrats won with slates of
both white and African American nominees in multi-member dis-
tricts in which African Americans were well under half of the
70. See NH House Roster Downloads, ST. N.H., supra note 69.
71. 2010 General Election Results, N.H. SECRETARY ST., http://sos.nh.gov/2010GenE
lectResults.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
72. State Representative-2012 General Election, N.H. SECRETARY ST., http://sos.nh.
gov/2012RepGen.aspx?id=28248 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
73. Richard J. Timpone, Electoral Systems Matter, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.fairvote.
org/?page=532 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
74. DOUGLAS J. AMY, BEHIND THE BALLOT Box 7 (2000).
75. Timpone, supra note 73 ("Scholars have often argued that women candidates do
better in multi-member district elections than in single member districts ... ").
76. See FAIRVOTE, DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 1982-2012 (forthcoming Apr. 2013),
http://www.fairvote.org/dubious-democracy (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) [hereinafter
DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2012]; House Roster, ARIZONA ST. LEGISLATURE, http://www.azleg.
gov/memberroster.asp?body=H (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (eighteen out of thirty); Legisla-
tive District Roster, MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/pubs-current/cur
rent-roster-house.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (thirty-six out of forty-seven); Legislative
Roster, N.J. LEGISLATURE, http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/members/roster.asp (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013) (twenty-eight out of forty); Roster of All Members, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE,
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rostersMembers.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (twenty-nine out
of forty-nine). The raw data analyzed in DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2012 is currently available
online. See Dubious Democracy: Updated FairVote Report Shows Dysfunctional House
Elections, FAIRVOTE (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.fairvote.org/dubious-democracy-updated-
fairvote-report-shows-dysfunctional-house-elections.
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electorate." But when the electorate is more racially polarized,
multi-member elections often result in racial minority vote dilu-
tion and, to the extent they do, are subject to judicial scrutiny
under Section 2.78 Indeed, it was a multi-member district system
that the Supreme Court struck down in 1973 as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.79
Given the gross distortions typical of winner-take-all, at-large
elections, the use of single-member districts has historically been
championed as the only way to guarantee some measure of repre-
sentation to minority interests, whether racial or otherwise.0 Dis-
trict systems may avoid sweeps for the entire legislative body,
making their winner-take-all nature less readily obvious. Howev-
er, winner-take-all districts only guarantee minority representa-
tion to the extent that the minority in question makes up a major-
ity of the voting population of at least one district; within other
districts, all voters in the minority remain unrepresented." As a
result, district systems only guarantee diversity to the extent that
people remain segregated enough to allow those in charge of re-
districting to group like-minded voters such that majorities of dif-
ferent groups are put into different legislative districts. Conse-
quently, single-member districts are properly categorized as
winner-take-all systems, as Republicans in Massachusetts and
77. See DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2012, supra note 76; cf. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345, 365 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986) (noting that in 1982, North Carolina elected eleven black citizens to the
state house of representatives and six of them were elected from majority-white multi-
member districts). The Gingles court also found that while white North Carolina Demo-
crats occasionally elected black candidates, "two-thirds of white voters did not vote for
black candidates in general elections even after the candidate had won the Democratic
primary and the only choice was to vote for a Republican or no one. Id. at 368. Similarly,
in Virginia, Delegate Bobby C. Scott of Newport News was elected to a multi-member state
senate district in which African Americans constituted a minority of the electorate. Cf.,
Thomas R. Morris and Neil Bradley, Virginia, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 17, at
271, 282; Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black
Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 111, 121 tbl.6 (1991)
(noting that in 1980 Virginia had one court-ordered multi-member state senate district
representing the Norfolk area).
78. See, e.g., Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48.
79. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973).
80. Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 2 ("[S]ingle-member districts have long been praised
for their ability to improve minority representation within the American winner-take-all
paradigm.").
81. See Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts, in MINORITY VOTE
DILUTION 249, 249 (Chandler Davidson, ed., 1984).
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Democrats in Oklahoma-who are shut out of any U.S. House
representation-are particularly quick to understand. 2
To the extent that a district encompasses a broad majority fa-
voring a certain type of candidate or political party-creating safe
districts, in which incumbents are routinely reelected-voting be-
comes a mere formality, a kind of rubber stamp for decisions
made by those drawing districts. 83 This problem occurs to some
extent in every district system, but becomes especially problemat-
ic in jurisdictions where incumbents are in control of drawing
their own districts.84 These incumbents can use their power to
group voters in districts in order to increase their own chances of
re-election, to help political allies, and to hurt political enemies."
C. The Modern Effect of Single-Member Districts in U.S. House
and State Legislative Elections
As a result of winner-take-all rules and the single-seat district
mandate, most U.S. House elections today are locked up for one
party's candidate. In each of the four national elections between
1998 and 2004, more than 90% of all races were won by non-
competitive margins of more than 10%.16 In 2012, the average vic-
tory margin topped 36%, and large areas of the nation were dom-
inated by one party.87 Democrats swept all twenty-one U.S. House
seats in New England while Republicans won all twenty-two
seats in the belt of states running from Arkansas through Okla-
homa, Kansas, Nebraska, the Dakotas, Montana, Wyoming, and
Idaho.8 Neither party won a single new U.S. House seat in the
other party's turf-that is, there were no gains by the minority
party in the 177 most Republican districts and the 176 most
Democratic districts.89
82. See AMY, supra note 74, at 35.
83. Id. at 39.
84. See id. at 37 (defining and explaining the practice of gerrymandering).
85. See id.
86. The Untouchables, supra note 4. The average victory margin from 1998 to 2004
was 40%. Id.
87. DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2012, supra note 76.
88. U.S. House: Full Results, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/election/2012/results/race/
house (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
89. Devin McCarthy, The 2012 Elections and the Vanishing Congressional Moderate,
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State legislative races provide even starker examples of how
single-seat, winner-take-all districts can utterly stifle democratic
participation. Nationally, nearly 40% of state legislative elections
only had one major party candidate in 2012, the highest rate of
such uncontested elections in recent history.9" Georgia Democrats
controlled their state legislature about a decade ago,91 but in 2012
did not even contest half of the seats.92 This lack of competition is
rooted in the near futility of one party seeking to win where the
other party has an edge. For example, consider that in North
Carolina's 2012 House elections, at least 118 of 120 seats went to
the nominee of the party holding a partisan advantage in that
district.93
Democrats similarly dominate their strongholds. In 2012, they
won 101 of 113 state legislative seats in Rhode Island;94 in Massa-
chusetts, Republicans fielded only 86 state legislative candidates
for 200 seats.95 Republicans last won a U.S. House seat in Massa-
chusetts in 1994. 9" The Maryland State Senate has been led by
FAIRVOTE (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.fairvote.orglthe-2012-elections-and-the-vanishing-
congressional-moderate; see Rob Richie, Eliminating Bias in House Races, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 2012, at A19.
90. Richard Winger, No Dem-Rep Contest in 40% of State Legislative Races, 28
BALLOT ACCESS NEWS, no. 6, Nov. 29, 2012, available at http://www.ballot-access.
orgt2012/1 1/29/november-2012-ballot-access-news-print-edition.
91. Eric Johnson, The Georgia Republican Party: 1856-2006: 150 Years to Victory,
REPUBLICAN PARTY GILMER COUNTY, at 10-11, http://www.gilmergagop.org/files/GA-
GOPHistory.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
92. See Georgia Election Results, ST. GA., http://results.enr.clarityelections.com
GA/42277/112167/en/summary.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012). About half of Georgia's
2012 legislative "races" involved only one Republican candidate, about a quarter involved
only one Democrat, and only the remaining quarter included any actual contest. See id.
93. DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2012, supra note 76; see also Rob Richie, Rigging Democra-
cy, IN THESE TIMES (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/14410/rigging_
democracy/.
94. 2012 Election Results, Senator in General Assembly, R.I. BOARD ELECTIONS (Nov.
26, 2012, 1:52 PM), http://www.ri.gov/election/results/2012/general-election/generalasse
mbly/senator/ (State Senate election results); 2012 Election Results, Representative in
General Assembly, R.I. BOARD ELECTIONS (Nov. 26, 2012, 1:52 PM), http://www.ri.gov/
electionlresults/2012/generalelectionlgeneral-assembly/representative/ (State House of
Representatives election results).
95. See 2012 State Election Candidates, SECRETARY COMMONWEALTH MASS.,
http://www.sec.state.ma.us/ele/ele12/stateelection cand_12.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2012).
96. See Bob Salsberg, Tisei Concedes Mass. 6th District Race to Tierney, BOSTON.COM
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2012/11/07/tisei-concedes-
mass-district-race-tierneyEFBXqFjUPawNAqmLd4X3aN/story.html; cf. Rob Richie &
Devin McCarthy, Nine House Races to Watch (and Five You Don't Have To) On Election
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Mike Miller, a Democrat, since 1987."7 Michael Madigan, also a
Democrat, has been speaker of the Illinois House of Representa-
tives for all but two years since 1983. 98
These trends can take on a distinctly racial character. In the
South, where VRA litigation has been most active in ensuring op-
portunities for racial minorities to elect candidates of choice
through the use of majority-minority districts,99 many states to-
day are polarized into representation dominated by white Repub-
licans in white majority districts and racial minority Democrats
in majority-minority districts.' Only very rarely is a minority
Republican or a white Democrat elected.'0' The Louisiana Senate,
for example, is composed of twenty-four Republicans, all of whom
are white, and fifteen Democrats, ten of whom are African Ameri-
can."°' In Congress, white Republicans in 2013 will represent six-
ty-six of seventy majority-white U.S. House districts in the ad-
joining nine states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, and Mis-
souri."' Of thirty-eight majority-white districts in the five states
of North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Ken-
tucky, white Republicans hold thirty-one seats and white Demo-
crats seven.' Southern, white-majority districts are also over-
whelmingly lopsided in their partisanship, making further
partisan changes unlikely over the next decade.0 5
Night, FAIRVOTE (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/nine-house-races-to-watch-and-
five-you-don-t-have-to-on-election-night (noting that before 2012, Republicans last had a
chance of winning a U.S. House seat in 1994).
97. Maryland Senate President, Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr., MD. ST. ARCHIVES,
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/05senlhtml]msaO1619.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2013).
98. Rep. Michael J. Madigan, ILL. HOUSE DEMOCRATS, http://www.housedem.state.
il.us/members/madiganml (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
99. See Naftali Bendavid, Southern White Democrats Face End of Era in Congress,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2012, at Al.
100. See id.; Campbell Robertson, White Democrats Lost More Ground in South, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at A20.
101. See Bendavid, supra note 99.
102. DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2012, supra note 76.
103. Id. The four other districts are Texas District 17 (represented by Latino Republi-
can Bill Flores), South Carolina District 1 (represented by African American Republican
Tim Scott), Missouri District 5 (represented by African American Democrat Emanuel
Cleaver), and Georgia District 12 (represented by white Democrat John Barrow). Id.
104. Id.
105. Compare, e.g., ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, Congressional District
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Setting aside Virginia, the thirteen remaining states' ninety-
eight white-majority districts are overwhelmingly non-
competitive."' Based on the 2008 presidential results in these dis-
tricts, ninety-five of them are among the safest Republican dis-
tricts in the nation and nearly all were won by Mitt Romney in
2012 by more than 10%.'07
The remaining twenty-five districts in these fourteen states are
majority-minority districts.' °8 They are represented by fifteen Af-
rican American Democrats, five Latino Democrats, five white
Democrats, and no Republicans. 109 White Democrats hold 8 (29%)
of these states' 28 U.S. Senate seats, but only 12 (9%) of 133 U.S.
11 (111th Congress), Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/fastfacts/ (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013) (find the 'Locate a District" box at the top of the screen; select 'Tex-
as" under "State" and click "Go"; select "Congressional District 11" under "District" and
click "Go"; find the "Fact Sheets" box below the 'Locate a District" box; follow "ACS Demo-
graphic Estimates: Profiles of Selected ACS Demographic Characteristics" hyperlink), and
ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, Congressional District 13 (111th Congress),
Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/fastfacts/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2013)
(find the "Locate a District" box at the top of the screen; select 'Texas" under "State" and
click "Go"; select "Congressional District 13" under "District" and click "Go"; find the "Fact
Sheets" box below the "Locate a District" box; follow "ACS Demographic Estimates: Pro-
files of Selected ACS Demographic Characteristics" hyperlink), and ACS Demographic and
Housing Estimates, Congressional District 6 (111th Congress), Alabama, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/fastfacts/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (find the "Locate a
District" box at the top of the screen; select "Alabama" under "State" and click "Go"; select
"Congressional District 6" under "District" and click "Go"; find the "Fact Sheets" box below
the "Locate a District" box; follow "ACS Demographic Estimates: Profiles of Selected ACS
Demographic Characteristics" hyperlink), with Partisan Voting Index, Districts of the
113th Congress: 2004 & 2008, COOK POL. REP., http://cookpolitical.com/application/writa
ble/uploads/2012_PVI-by_.PVI_Value.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). The Cook Report in-
dicates Texas's Districts 13 and 11 and Alabama's District 6 were the top three most par-
tisan congressional districts in the 2008 presidential election. Id. All three districts leaned
heavily Republican. Id.
106. See id.; see also FAIRVOTE, DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2010 (May 31, 2011), available at
http://www.fairvote.org/assetsfUploads/DubiousDemocracy2010.pdf (rating the competi-
tiveness of each State's congressional races).
107. David Nir, Daily Kos Elections' Presidential Results by Congressional District for
the 2012 and 2008 Elections, DAILY Kos (Nov. 19, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://www.dailykos.
com/storyl20l2/11/19/1163009/-Daily-kos-elections-presidential-results-by-congressional-
district-for-the-2012-2008-elections. This is based on partisanship results from 2008 presi-
dential election. All ten districts won by John McCain by a margin of at least 40% are in-
cluded in these ninety-eight districts. The three that Mitt Romney did not carry all lean
Democratic and are represented by Democratic members. Id.
108. DUBIOUS DEMOCRACY 2012, supra note 76. Majority-minority districts are
designated as congressional districts in which less than 50% of the voting age population
is white.
109. See id.; Guide to the New Congress, CQ ROLL CALL 17 (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.
cq.com/flatfiles/editorialfiles/membersFactFiles/guidetothenewcongress 1O82012.pdf.
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House seats."' If one adds the 17 U.S. House Republicans from
Florida, nearly half (116) of the entire 2013 Republican U.S.
House caucus of 234 members will come from the South-in
sharp contrast to 1991 when southern Republicans held just for-
ty-seven U.S. House seats compared to ninety-five Democrats,
eighty-five of whom were white."'
Women congressional candidates also fare very poorly in this
region. In the U.S. House as a whole, men will hold approximate-
ly 82% of seats in 2013, but will represent more than 90% of seats
in the same fourteen southern states. 1 2 Not a single woman holds
one of the fifty-one U.S. House seats in Arkansas, Georgia, Loui-
siana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia."3
The South Carolina State Senate in 2012 was the nation's only
state legislative chamber without a single woman representa-
tive."4
The use of single-member district elections also has created an
overall bias in U.S. House elections that challenges democratic
norms. In 2012, Democratic U.S. House candidates won about a
million more votes nationwide than Republicans and would have
increased that margin to four percentage points if all races had
been contested and incumbent bias eliminated."'
Yet despite that preference and the Democratic Party's success
in elections for president and the U.S. Senate, U.S. House Repub-
licans won a comfortable majority of seats, with 234 seats to
Democrats' 201.11'6 Ticket-splitting was not the cause, as there
110. See Danny Dougherty & Alex Tribou, Balance of Power: 113th Congress,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2012), http://go.bloomberg.com/multimedia/the-balance-of-power-for-
the-ll3th-congress/; see also Guide to the New Congress, CQ ROLL CALL, supra note 109.
111. See MILDRED L. AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30378, AFRICAN AMERICAN
MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1870-2008, at 42-46, 51 (2008); DUBIOUS
DEMOCRACY 2012, supra note 76; Dougherty & Tribou, supra note 110.
112. See Women in Congress, NAT'L J., www.nationaljournal.comlalmanac/women (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013); Alex Burn, 113th Congress Welcomes Benches Full of Women, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Nov. 16, 2012, 1:15 AM), http://www.pbs.org/newshours/mndown/2012/ll/in-
the-113th-Congress---benches-full-of-women.html.
113. See Women in Congress, NAT'L L.J., supra note 112.
114. CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN IN POLITICS, WOMEN IN STATE LEGISLATURES 2012 (Sept.
2012), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast-facts/levels of-office/documents/stleg.pdf.
115. Rob Richie & Devin McCarthy, The House GOP Can't Be Beat: It's Worse than
Gerrymandering, SALON (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/01/13/thehousegop_
cant_bebeat_itsworsethan -gerrymandering/.
116. Id.
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were fewer than twenty-five districts in which one party's nomi-
nee carried the presidential vote and the other party's nominee
won the congressional race.1 ' The real problem for Democrats
was that in a year in which Barack Obama won a decisive presi-
dential election victory, he carried no more than 207 of 435 con-
gressional districts.' 8 Analyses by FairVote and the Brennan
Center suggest that gerrymandering was the cause of some of
this bias, but that the Democrats' biggest problem was their rela-
tive "clustering" in metropolitan areas that led to inefficient dis-
tribution of voting power across congressional districts. 9 In a de-
tailed analysis of the upcoming congressional midterm elections,
Emory University Professor Alan Abramowitz determined that
Democrats would be unlikely to earn a majority of U.S. House
seats without earning a two-party preference of more than 56% to
44% in 2014.120
D. Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering traditionally refers to the drawing of districts
in such a way as to favor the election of a particular type of can-
didate."' It can also be applied to other factors, including group-
ing voters by race, when those factors become more important
than following geographical features or existing political bounda-
ries.'
Race-based gerrymandering initially served as a tool for dimin-
ishing racial minority votes in states using district systems to
maximize the number of districts in which whites make up a ma-
jority."' Where it is used to diminish representation on the basis
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Alan I. Abramowitz, Midterm Forecast: Democrats May Gain House Seats in
2014 but Majority Probably Out of Reach, U. VA. CENTER FOR POL. (Feb. 7, 2013), http://
www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/midterm-forecast-democrats-may-gain-house
-seats -in-2014-but-majority-probably-out-of-reach.
121. AMY, supra note 74, at 37; Redistricting Glossary, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.
org/redistricting-glossary#.UKo98uSA5cO (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
122. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (determining the presence of racial
gerrymandering by comparing the degree to which race was considered versus traditional
redistricting considerations.).
123. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993) (describing the history of racial ger-
rymandering).
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of race, such gerrymandering may result in liability under the
VRA. 24 Jurisdictions covered under Section 5 must especially
prove that their districting is not intended to diminish racial mi-
nority electoral opportunities or federal courts may impose a new
map on them, as occurred in Texas following its 2011 redistrict-
ing.
125
Within the confines of limiting voting rights remedies to win-
ner-take-all systems, race-conscious districting became the vehi-
cle for racial minorities to dramatically expand their representa-
tion in federal, state, and local elections in the half century since
passage of the VRA.12' However, the Supreme Court later held
that the intentional creation of majority-minority districts itself
may constitute illegal race-based gerrymandering. 127 In order to
use a district system to remedy a VRA violation based on winner-
take-all, at-large elections, the districts must be drawn in such a
way as to ensure the existence of some number of majority-
minority districts. 28 This necessarily requires drawing distinc-
tions among voters based on race, and "[r]acial and ethnic distinc-
tions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination.' ' 2' As a result, racial gerryman-
ders, "even for remedial purposes," will be subject to strict scruti-
ny.3° This complicates the use of district systems to ensure racial
minority representation, as members of the racial minority in
question either must be sufficiently segregated into a particular
area such that a majority-minority district can be drawn without
the need for crossing a vaguely defined line of excessive use of
race in redistricting decisions, or they must be sufficiently polar-
124. See id. at 680-81 & n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting); Armand Derfner, Vote Dilution
and the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note
81, at 145, 150.
125. See Texas v. United States, No. 11-1303, 2012 WL 3671924, at *1-2 (D.D.C. Aug.
28, 2012); Derfner, supra note 124, at 149.
126. AMY, supra note 74, at 6.
127. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641 (comparing remedial majority-minority districts to "the
most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past").
128. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923 (1995) (describing plans that in-
crease the number of majority-minority districts as "ameliorative"); Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997, 1016, 1029 (1994) (analyzing how many majority-minority districts are
needed to satisfy Section 2).
129. Miller, 515 U.S. at 904 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 291 (1978)).
130. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
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ized by political party to allow the use of partisanship as a
131proxy.
Unlike race-based gerrymandering, partisan gerrymandering is
currently legal. It may be unconstitutional if "excessive,' 32 but so
far no plan has been struck down purely for excessive partisan
gerrymandering despite countless examples of transparently hy-
per-partisan maps. 3 Partisan gerrymandering occurs whenever
districts are intentionally designed to ensure the election of a
candidate from a particular political party.' This occurs most
clearly in states where the elected legislative body designs the
district map. For example, the Republican-controlled legislature
of North Carolina redrew its districts in 2011, resulting in a
number of strangely shaped districts designed to maximize Re-
publican advantage.135 North Carolina voters divide their two-
party preference approximately 53% Republican to 47% Demo-
cratic, and a majority of its popular vote went to Democratic U.S.
House candidates in 2012,136 yet the state's thirteen congressional
districts include ten heavily Republican districts, nine of which
are now represented by Republicans. 1 7 Similarly, Maryland's
Democrat-controlled legislature also redistricted the state in
2011, creating a map maximizing Democratic advantage: Mary-
land voters divide approximately 59% Democratic to 41% Repub-
131. Mulroy, supra note 10, at 348.
132. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 285-86, 293 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at
307 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting), id. at 355
(Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) ("[In Vieth], all but one of the Justices agreed that [politics] is a ... constitutional [re-
districting criterion], so long as it does not go too far.").
133. See e.g., Vieth, 541 U.S. at 279-81 (finding that there is no judicially manageable
standard for adjudicating claims of political gerrymandering). But see Cox, 542 U.S. at
947, 952 (affirming the district court's rejection of a state reapportionment plan, but bas-
ing its decision on the plan's violation of the one-person, one-vote principle and not reach-
ing the question of whether the plan was the result of an unconstitutional partisan gerry-
mander).
134. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999).
135. See Michael Cooper, Carving Up Urban Areas as Parties Seek Influence, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2011, at A22.
136. 2011 Redistricting and 2012 Elections in North Carolina, FAIRVOTE (Sept. 2012),
http://www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-Redistricting/NCRedistrictingAnalysis.pdf; Election
2012 News, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, http://elections.charlotteobserver.com/2012/general/
htmllncl (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
137. Election 2012 News, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, supra note 136.
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lican, yet Democrats in 2012 won seven of the state's eight
seats.
138
Partisan gerrymandering can be partially remedied by putting
redistricting in the hands of nonpartisan commissions; however,
states with commissions often face legal battles and questions as
to whether the commission has really acted independently of par-
tisanship.139 Even when districts are drawn without any consider-
ation of voter characteristics, district systems inevitably will still
have a major problem with noncompetitive or safe districts, and
they give no guarantee of a level playing field. For example, Cali-
fornia used a commission to draw congressional districts in
2011."° While Republican candidates for President and U.S. Sen-
ate both earned about 37% of the vote in 2012, Republicans only
won fifteen (28%) of the state's fifty-three U.S. House seats and
less than one-third of state legislative seats.'
Single-seat districts have other limitations as well. As men-
tioned earlier, more women candidates run and win in multi-
member districts.4 2 And while districts that are drawn to boost
racial minorities can indeed help elect those voters' candidates of
choice, doing so requires encircling an area that has a majority of
racial minority voters.' Outside of those districts, racial minority
voters will often continue to be without real opportunities to elect
candidates of choice.' Consider that each state is a kind of win-
ner-take-all district for the purposes of electing U.S. Senators. Of
fifty states, forty-nine have a white voting plurality-and in the
138. 2011 Redistricting and 2012 Elections in Maryland, FAIRVOTE (Sept. 2012), http://
www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-Redistricting/MDRedistrictingAnalysis.pdf; Official 2012
Presidential General Election Results for Representative in Congress; MD. ST. BOARD
ELECTIONS, http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2012lresults/general/gen-results_2
012_4_008X.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
139. See, e.g., Mary Jo Pitzl, Arizona Redistricting Chief Ousted, AZCENTRAL.COM (Nov.
2, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/election/azelections/articles/20111101
arizona-redistricting-brewer-wants-chair-Mathis-removed.html; Olga Pierce & Jeff Lar-
son, How Democrats Fooled California's Redistricting Commission, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21,
2011, 2:38 PM), http://www.propublica.orglarticle/how-democrats-fooled-californias-redis
tricting-commission.
140. See Evan Halper & Richard Simon, Maps Draw a New Political Landscape, L.A.
TIMES, June 11, 2011, at Al.
141. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF THE VOTE (Nov. 6, 2012),
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012-general/sov-complete.pdf.
142. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 99-100 and accompanying text.
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113th Congress, ninety-five of these senators are white, with
three Cuban Americans.'45 Hawaii has an Asian American voting
plurality, and until the recent death of Senator Daniel K. Inouye,
it had been represented by two senators of Asian American de-
scent since 1990.146 Only three African Americans have been
elected to the U.S. Senate since Reconstruction, and two were de-
feated in bids for re-election. " ' Such results suggest that a switch
to single-seat districts does not automatically create fair repre-
sentation, and far too often the election is effectively decided by
whichever elite group is in charge of redistricting, rather than the
much larger group that votes.
II. NON-WINNER-TAKE-ALL VOTING
The United States has a history of using alternative approach-
es to winner-take-all elections.148 These alternative approaches
require some form of at-large or multi-member districts and use
of a voting system in which 51% of voters cannot dominate 100%
of representation. 9 American localities today use three non-
winner-take-all election methods: choice voting, limited voting,
and cumulative voting.' Choice voting, which is the focus of this
article, is the most reliable of these three methods for accurately
145. See Ethnic Diversity in the Senate, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artand
history/history/common/briefing/minority-senators.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013); see
also About Ted, U.S. SENATE, http://www.cruz.senate.govlabout.cfm (last visited Feb. 18,
2013) (biography of Texas Senator Ted Cruz); Biography, U.S. SENATE, http://www.rubio.
senate.gov/public/index.cfmabout?p=biography (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (biography of
Florida Senator Marco Rubio); Shailagh Murray & Karen DeYoung, Momentum Grows for
Relaxing Cuba Policy: Senate Measure Would Eliminate Travel Ban, WASH. POST (Mar. 30,
2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/29/AR20090329024
60.html (describing New Jersey Senator Bob Menendez as a Cuban American).
146. See Ethnic Diversity in the Senate, U.S. SENATE, supra note 145. Inouye's seat was
filled by Senator Brian Schatz, a white Democrat. Brian Schatz, U.S. SENATE, http:/Iwww.
senate.gov/senators/ll2/SchatzBrian.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
147. Breaking New Ground-African American Senators, U.S. SENATE, http://www.sen
ate.gov/pagelayout/history/h.multisections-and-teasers/Photo-Exhibit-African -America
nSenators.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). They were Edward Brooke in 1967, Carol
Moseley Braun in 1992, and Barack Obama in 2004. Id.
148. See Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1868; Robert Richie & Steven Hill, The Case for
Proportional Representation, in REFLECTING ALL OF US: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION 3, 23 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999).
149. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 338-39.
150. Id. at 339.
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representing voters and upholding the principle of one person,
one vote.'5 '
Choice voting permits candidates or parties who receive less
than majority support to receive some degree of representation.152
It minimizes wasted votes, avoids tactical voting, and renders
highly representative results when turnout is equitable and di-
verse candidates seek office. 153 Choice voting has been used in cit-
ies throughout the United States, including city council elections
in New York, Cincinnati, and Cleveland."' It currently is used by
voters in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Cambridge, Massachusetts
and, overseas, by every voter in at least one governmental elec-
tion in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland."'
151. As indicated earlier, what we refer to as "choice voting" throughout has alterna-
tively been referred to as "preference voting," "single transferable vote," or by reference to
one particular tabulation method, such as "the Hare system." See supra note 10. Outside
the scope of this article are the many other systems of non-winner-take-all voting that are
common around the world, but have not yet been tried in the United States. For example,
drawing on the example of the mixed member systems used in Germany and other
nations, a state legislature could have some number of single-member district seats and
some number of accountability seats awarded to ensure that the partisanship of the state's
legislature accurately reflects the partisanship of the statewide vote. See Reforms to
Enhance Independent Redistricting Proposals, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/re forms-
to-enhance-independent-redistricting-proposals/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (describing the
use of a district plus system to achieve proportional representation). Alternatively,
drawing on the unordered open list system used in Finland, voters could vote for one
partisan candidate in multi-member districts, and the district would elect candidates from
parties in proportion to each party's candidate votes, with a party's share of seats filled by
candidates from the parties that received the most votes. See U. COLLEGE LONDON, THE
CONSTITUTION UNIT, ELECTIONS UNDER REGIONAL LISTS 2, 4 (Jan. 1998), available at http
://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/publications/unit-publications/20.pdf (describing the various forms of
list systems).
152. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 333 n.1.
153. See id. at 341-42, 350; Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1911-12.
154. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 341-42; Kevin Reyes, Note, Redistricting or Rethink-
ing? Why Proportional Representation May Be a Better Solution than California's Inde-
pendent Redistricting Commission, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 655, 674 (2011).
155. See Minn. Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 685-86 (Minn.
2009); Reyes, supra note 154, at 675; Proportional Representation in Most Robust
Democracies, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/PR-in-most-robust-democracies (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013); Scotland Holds Proportional Voting Elections, FAIRVOTE, http://
www.fairvote.org/Scotland-holds-proportional-voting-elections (last visited Feb. 18, 2013);
The 2007 Northern Ireland Elections: Proportional Voting Helps Moderates, FAIRVOTE,
http://www.fairvote.org/the-2007-northern-ireland-elections-proportional-voting-helps-
moderates (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
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Choice voting will maximize the number of voters who elect one
of their favorite candidates under two conditions: (1) when there
are candidates who reflect the diversity of views within a jurisdic-
tion; and (2) when voters rank candidates reflecting their views in
order of preference. 5 ' Voters' power in a choice voting election de-
rives from the fact that choice voting guarantees election of every
candidate who achieves greater support than the threshold of ex-
clusion.' 7 The threshold of exclusion refers to the minimum per-
cent of the vote necessary to win a seat in a multi-member dis-
trict or at-large body.' s For winner-take-all systems, the
threshold of exclusion is generally 50% plus one vote or higher,
virtually guaranteeing a sweep of the election to the candidates
that reflect the interests of the majority, irrespective of how well
they represent minority viewpoints." 9 For choice voting, the
threshold of exclusion depends on the number of seats being
elected.' s Candidates will be elected if they receive one more than
a percentage of the vote equal to one divided by one more than
the number of candidates.' If choice voting were applied to a sin-
gle-member district, the winning candidate would need one vote
more than one-half, or 50% plus one vote;162 in a two-seat election,
a candidate would need one vote more than one-third, or 33.33%
plus one vote; in a three-seat election the candidate would need
one vote more than one-fourth, or 25% plus one vote; in a four-
seat election the candidate would need one vote more than one-
fifth, or 20% plus one vote; and so on, with representation becom-
156. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 342, 350.
157. See id. at 339, 342.
158. Id. at 339.
159. See id. at 336-38.
160. See id. at 341-42.
161. Id. at 342. This represents the fewest votes that only the winning number of can-
didates can obtain. For example, it is mathematically impossible for four (or more) candi-
dates to receive more than 25% of the vote each. Consequently, one vote more than 25% is
the threshold of election for three seats, because only three candidates can possibly
achieve that threshold. In contrast, a winner-take-all election for three at-large seats can
result in the defeat of a candidate who receives a vote from as many as 74% of voters.
162. Id. When applied to an election with a single winner, choice voting is equivalent to
instant runoff voting, the system used for single-member districts in the California Bay
Area, as well as a number of other jurisdiction in the U.S. See, e.g., Dudum v. Arntz, 640
F.3d 1098, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2011); Minn. Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766
N.W.2d 683, 685-86 (Minn. 2009); Ranked Choice Voting in Bay Area Elections, FAIRVOTE,
http://www.fairvote.org/ranked-choice-voting-in-bay-area-elections (last visited Feb. 18,
2013).
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ing more proportional the greater the number of seats to be filled.
Cincinnati, Ohio and Cambridge, Massachusetts have each used
choice voting to elect nine-seat bodies, making their thresholds of
exclusion 10% plus one vote.'
Because choice voting allows like-minded voters to elect candi-
dates in rough proportion to their share of the electorate, it is of-
ten described as "proportional representation."' 6 4 Although pro-
portional representation often conjures up images of the closed
party list systems used throughout Europe,'65 choice voting is a
candidate-based system that has nothing to do with parliamen-
tary forms of government; it requires candidates to compete for a
higher threshold of votes than the European multiparty systems;
and it can be used in wholly non-partisan elections. 6
A. Choice Voting Mechanics
Choice voting allows voters to rank candidates in order of pref-
erence. 6 ' It reliably provides fair representation because, in addi-
tion to guaranteeing representation based on the threshold of ex-
clusion, it also minimizes wasted votes.' Very popular
candidates who receive more first-choice support than the thresh-
163. See Reyes, supra note 154, at 675, 681; Cambridge Municipal Elections, CITY OF
CAMBRIDGE, MASS. http://www.cambridgema.gov/election/programsandservices/cambridge
municipalelections.aspx (click "How to Vote in a Proportional Election") (last visited Feb.
18, 2013) (describing the election process for the nine-seat City Council).
164. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E. 2d 30, 31, 34-36 (N.Y. 1937) (de-
scribing choice voting throughout as "proportional representation").
165. See, e.g., Lesley Dingle & Bradley Miller, A Summary of Recent Constitutional Re-
form in the United Kingdom, 33 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 71, 94 (2005); NICOLAS STRAUCH &
ROBERTAS POGORELIS, OFFICE FOR PROMOTION OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY,
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THE LINK BETWEEN GOVERNANCE, ELECTED MEMBERS AND VOTERS
19, 78 (2011); cf. Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1877 n.48 (warning that preference voting
should not be confused with European party-list parliamentary systems).
166. AMY, supra note 74, at 100.
167. Id. at 96. In jurisdictions that cannot accommodate ranked ballots, an alternative
system called the free vote requires voters to only mark one candidate and then transfers
votes based on the relative vote totals of the candidates' political parties or teams. Fair
Voting in the United States, FAIRVOTE (Oct. 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-
Redistricting/FairVotingMethods.pdf. This system is less preferable to choice voting be-
cause it does not allow voters to express their own preferences; but to the extent that party
or team preference tracks voter preference, it can serve as an adequate substitute.
168. Wasted votes are those cast for a candidate whose outcome was assured even
without them, such as an extremely popular standout candidate is certain to win or a
longshot candidate with little chance of winning. See AMY, supra note 74, at 97-99; Reyes,
supra note 154, at 685.
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old of exclusion for the election have their surplus votes (that is,
those votes beyond the threshold of exclusion) added to the totals
of their voters' second choices; " candidates with little support
have their votes added to their voters' next-ranked choices.17 As a
result of these transfers, voters can place their preferences hon-
estly and still be confident that they will help to elect one of their
top choice candidates. 7'
By minimizing wasted votes, choice voting minimizes incen-
tives for tactical voting and for limiting voter choice to avoid vote-
splitting, thereby allowing minority viewpoints a fair level of rep-
resentation without the downsides associated with both winner-
take-all and less effective, non-winner-take-all methods.172 Under
other voting methods, candidates and voters must try to minimize
the possibility of wasted votes on their own, by limiting the num-
ber of candidates running or by voting for a less-preferred candi-
date who is more likely to win rather than a more-preferred can-
didate who has little chance of success.'73 By dealing with wasted
votes directly, choice voting renders those tactics unnecessary.
Furthermore, choice voting has repeatedly been used effective-
ly by voters with a range of educational backgrounds.'74 Voters
will cast a fully effective ballot by doing just what the ballot
should instruct them to do: ranking candidates in order of choice.
169. The actual mechanism by which votes are transferred may vary, but the most ac-
curate methods are based on distributing all ballots to the next-ranked candidate at an
equally reduced value, with the result being that a portion of a person's vote elects their
first-choice candidate and a portion is transferred to count for their next-choice candidate.
See, e.g., Voters' Choice Act, H.R. 2545, 104th Cong. (lst Sess. 1995).
170. See, e.g., AMY, supra note 74, at 98-99.
171. Id. at 100.
172. See Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence: An Essay on Voting Sys-
tems in the United States, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1119, 1161, 1165-66 (1998) (noting that tacti-
cal voting and limiting voter choice are possible, but unlikely, in multi-member districts);
Reyes, supra note 154, at 684; Troy M. Yoshino, Still Keeping the Faith?: Asian Pacific
Americans, Ballot Initiatives, and the Lessons of Negotiated Rulemaking, 6 ASIAN L.J. 1,
59 (1999).
173. Tony Anderson SolgArd & Paul Landskroener, Municipal Voting System Reform:
Overcoming the Legal Obstacles, 59 BENCH & B. OF MINN. (Minn. State Bar Assoc.), Oct.
2002 (noting that winner-take-all systems result in one-party domination and little choice
for voters).
174. NEW AM. FOUND. & FARVOTE, INSTANT RUNOFF VOTING AND ITS IMPACT ON
RACIAL MINORITIES 3 n.5 (June 2008), available at http://archive.fairvote.org/media/irv/
irvracememo.pdf.
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Experience has shown that, on a well-designed ballot, voters are
able to easily rank candidates.""
B. Comparison of Choice Voting to Cumulative Voting and
Limited Voting
The two other American forms of non-winner-take-all voting
are cumulative voting and limited voting. 7' With cumulative vot-
ing, a voter may cast a number of votes equal to the number of
seats to be filled, and the voter may arrange those votes freely,
including by giving more than one vote to a single candidate.177
Cumulative voting is commonly used in corporate elections to
prevent majority shareholders from controlling the entire board
of directors. 7 ' With the one-vote form of limited voting, a voter
may cast only one vote, irrespective of the number of seats to be
elected; other limited voting systems allow voters to cast more
than one vote, but never more than one vote per candidate. 79
With both cumulative and limited voting, the candidates who re-
ceive the most votes are the winners.
These systems tend to result in minority viewpoints gaining
more representation; consequently they have received a good deal
of attention for use in VRA cases as a way to remedy minority
vote dilution without resorting to majority-minority districts in
small jurisdictions.' They have been adopted to resolve nearly
one hundred VRA cases since 1986, almost always where racial
minorities only have sufficient voting strength to elect one candi-
date.' When one racial minority candidate has run in these elec-
tions, and that minority's share of voters is above the threshold of
175. Id. at 3.
176. Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1876-77.
177. Id. at 1878.
178. Amihai Glazer, Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy
Into the Equation, 35 S.C. L. REV. 295, 295 (1984); see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 909
n.15 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
179. Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1877.
180. Id. at 1880.
181. Ten Proposals for Electoral Reform State Legislation, FAIRVOTE, 2, http://archive.
fairvote.org/media/general/TenStateReforms.pdf; see generally Edward Still, Cumulative
Voting and Limited Voting in Alabama, in UNITED STATES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THEIR
IMPACT ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES 183 (Wilma Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman eds., 1992)
[hereinafter UNITED STATES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS] (describing the successful use of limited
and cumulative voting in VRA settlements).
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exclusion, alternative voting systems have reliably elected the
minority group's candidate of choice."8 2
However, both cumulative voting and limited voting are vul-
nerable to issues with vote-splitting where too many like-minded
candidates run.'83 As a result, they can fail to provide fair repre-
sentation or can result in efforts to suppress candidates to avoid a
spoiler candidacy." 4 For example, suppose racial minority voters
make up 25% of a jurisdiction that has a history of racially polar-
ized voting and that uses limited voting or cumulative voting to
elect a five-member city council. With a threshold of exclusion of
17%, either one or two of the minority voters' candidates of choice
should be elected. However, by running two candidates, they risk
electing zero candidates of choice, because if the 25% vote is split
evenly between the two candidates, neither would be elected.
In contrast, choice voting has worked well in complex jurisdic-
tions with diverse racial minority communities, where the poten-
tial for split votes would otherwise be more likely. 8' Likewise,
choice voting is far more flexible than other alternative systems
in accommodating realistic scenarios. Suppose a racial minority
has the potential to elect two or more seats, but there are "too
many" candidates backed by racial minority voters or there is a
very popular candidate who receives far more first choice support
than necessary to win. Alternatively, suppose there is an emerg-
ing racial minority that seems to have insufficient support to win,
but sponsors a candidate who runs hard in an effort to win. These
situations may result in wasted votes and no victories under lim-
ited or cumulative voting because those systems are "all or noth-
ing"-that is, they do not provide the opportunity for voters to in-
dicate second-choice support, and they often encourage tactics
such as suppressing candidates or telling voters to cast votes for
someone other than their first choice.8 6 Choice voting handles
such situations through the simple tool of having voters indicate
182. Still, supra note 181, at 191.
183. See Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1910.
184. See id.; Jeffrey C. O'Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not Necessarily
Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327,
329 n.5 (2006).
185. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 342.
186. Robert Richie, Full Representation: The Future of Proportional Election Systems,
87 NAT'L CIVIc REV. 85, 87 (1998); see Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1911-12.
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backup choices in addition to their first choice.'87 As a result, each
like-minded group's chance for representation is preserved while
still allowing the opportunity to help second or third choices,
thereby making it possible for candidates to run freely and to
campaign positively to be the second choices of more voters, in-
cluding voters from other racial groups.
For these reasons, the use of cumulative or limited voting-
while often an improvement on winner-take-all, at-large systems
and single-member districts-is less likely than choice voting to
promote voter choice and to achieve full and fair representation.
III. CHOICE VOTING AS A REMEDY IN VOTING RIGHTS ACT CASES
Section 2 prohibits states and political subdivisions from enact-
ing any "standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a
denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color."'88 Since 1969, the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that electoral systems which di-
lute the efficacy of the votes of racial minorities could come under
the umbrella of this prohibition.'89
Initially, the Court interpreted this clause to have no legal ef-
fect aside from restating the law of the Fifteenth Amendment. 9 °
However, when Congress amended the VRA in 1982, it used Sec-
tion 2 to limit the effect of the Court's decision in City of Mobile v.
Bolden, which had required a showing of discriminatory purpose
in order to establish a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. 19'
The amendment required that electoral schemes be reviewed un-
der a totality of circumstances test to determine whether they
violate Section 2, and it recommended a variety of typical factors
187. Choice Voting, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.org/what-is-choice-voting (last visit-
ed Feb. 18, 2013).
188. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
189. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
190. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) ("[The language of § 2 no more
than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and the sparse legislative history
of § 2 makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fif-
teenth Amendment itself." (footnote omitted)).
191. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) ('The amendment was largely a re-
sponse to... Mobile v. Bolden, which had declared that, in order to establish a violation
either of § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove
that a contested electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state
officials for a discriminatory purpose." (citation omitted)).
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useful to determine liability.92 In 1986, the Court decided Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, in which it distilled this statutory mandate to a
simple test for finding liability in the context of challenges to at-
large and multi-member, winner-take-all election systems.' Re-
flecting a focus only on variations of winner-take-all elections, it
included the need to show a winner-take-all remedy in establish-
ing liability. 94 Its three-pronged test is: (1) the minority group
must be large enough and geographically cohesive enough to con-
stitute a majority-minority district; (2) the minority group must
be politically cohesive; and (3) the minority must demonstrate
that the white majority engages in bloc voting to frustrate the
election of minority candidates of choice.'95
In 2013, the Supreme Court will be reviewing the constitution-
ality of Section 5, which requires covered jurisdictions to seek
preclearance of changes to electoral law and procedures.9 If the
Court strikes down or weakens Section 5, it will likely do so in
part on the ground that Section 2 provides sufficient protection of
racial minorities' voting rights.97 Accordingly, without ongoing
oversight of redistricting decisions made by states and localities
in the covered jurisdictions, it may become critical for Section 2 to
provide the best possible remedies for racial minority vote dilu-
tion that are not dependent on Department of Justice oversight of
redistricting. Choice voting may prove indispensable to that goal
as it has contributed directly to representation of racial minori-
ties in a variety of settings, including New York City, Cleveland,
and Cincinnati.'98 As the Kerner Commission noted of Cincinnati
in 1968:
Although the city's Negro population had been rising swiftly-in
1967, 135,000 out of the city's 500,000 residents were Negroes-
there was only one Negro on the city council. In the 1950's, with a far
smaller Negro population, there had been two. Negroes attributed
192. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07;
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37.
193. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
194. See id. at 50 & n.17.
195. Id. at 50-51.
196. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 852-53 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, -
U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 594 (Nov. 9, 2012).
197. Id. at 863-64 (noting that the constitutionality of Section 5 may turn on the ade-
quacy of Section 2).
198. See generally KATHLEEN L. BARBER, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND
ELECTION REFORM IN OHIO (1995) (describing the use of choice voting in five Ohio cities as
well as New York City).
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this to dilution of the Negro vote throuvh abolition of the proportion-
al representation system of electing the nine councilmen.
Indeed, the Department of Justice in 1999 denied preclearance to
New York City when it sought to replace choice voting with lim-
ited voting for its local school board elections in order to be able to
count ballots on the city's lever machines. °° Where fair represen-
tation is the goal, choice voting is the most reliable option. It
should therefore be considered a favored remedy under the VRA.
A. Consistency of Choice Voting with Thornburg v. Gingles
The first Gingles factor-requiring sufficient size and compact-
ness for drawing a majority-minority district-seems to suppose
that single-seat districts operate as a default electoral form with
only at-large and multi-member districts judged in comparison.
The Supreme Court justified this factor by stating that if it is not
met, then the racial minority voters cannot demonstrate potential
to elect representatives "in the absence of the [challenged] struc-
ture."'' Although the Court never states that a district system
must be used as a remedy, it does assert that a single-seat dis-
trict "is generally the appropriate standard against which to
measure minority group potential to elect because it is the small-
est political unit from which representatives are elected. 20 2
1. Compactness as a Benchmark for Liability
Courts have often used geographic compactness in a single-seat
district as a benchmark for determining whether liability exists
199. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 26 (1968).
200. Letter from Bill Lann Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Eric Proshansky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York
(Feb. 4, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ny-obj2.htm; Rob Richie,
Winning Fair Representation with Alternative Voting Systems, 22 SOUTHERN CHANGES, no.
4, 2000, at 24; Douglas Amy et al., New Means for Political Empowerment: Proportional
Voting, FAIRVOTE, http://archive.Fairvote.org/index.php?page=39&articlemode=showspec
ific&sho warticle=1832 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
201. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986).
202. Id.
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under Section 2 .203 This interpretation derives, in part, from Jus-
tice O'Connor's explanation of the factors in concurrence:
In order to evaluate a claim that a particular multimember district
or single-member district has diluted the minority group's voting
strength to a degree that violates § 2, however, it is also necessary to
construct a measure of "undiluted" minority voting strength.... Put
simply, in order to decide whether an electoral system has made it
harder for minority voters to elect the candidates they prefer, a court
must have an idea in mind of how hard it "should" be for minority
voters to elect their preferred candidates under an acceptable sys-
tem.20 4
The Court later cited this passage in Holder v. Hall for the
proposition that the Gingles criteria require a court to "find a rea-
sonable alternative practice as a benchmark against which to
measure the existing voting practice., 20 5 This interpretation of
Gingles suggests that its three-pronged test only affects the liabil-
ity stage of litigation, when a court must determine whether it
would be fair to find liability under Section 2, irrespective of what
remedy the court may later impose.26 Accordingly, choice voting
should not be excluded as a remedy to Section 2 liability.
2. Relevance of Compactness for Single-Seat Remedies Only
An even more promising interpretation of the first Gingles fac-
tor would be the sensible decision to apply the factor only in cases
requesting single-member districts as a remedy. Although the
Court seemed to assume plaintiffs and defendants would focus on
single-member district remedies, nothing in the language of Sec-
tion 2 limits remedies in such a way.20 7 For that reason, a differ-
ent standard of liability should also be necessary if the parties to
203. See, e.g., Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 558 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(finding a lack of Section 2 liability but expressing no opinion on the propriety of district
court's imposition of cumulative voting); S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions,
56 F.3d 1281, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995) (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512
U.S. 874, 880 (1994) (plurality opinion); id. at 886-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (suggest-
ing that the compactness requirement looks to a hypothetical single-member district as a
"benchmark"); Cousin v. McWherther, 904 F. Supp. 686, 713 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (describing
the factor as "a threshold showing"), rev'd on other grounds, vacated sub nom. Cousin v.
Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998).
204. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
206. See id. at 880-81.
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
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the case focus on a different remedy. This reading would interpret
the factor as merely stating that without some alternative to the
challenged structure, no injury can lie. The fact that the Court
used the possibility of majority-minority districts as the alterna-
tive in Gingles reflects only that such districts were the only rem-
edy being sought in early cases to come before the Court. °8
This interpretation has a great deal of support in Supreme
Court reasoning. First, in Gingles itself, the Court merely held
that plaintiffs must demonstrate that they would have the poten-
tial to elect in the absence of the challenged structure, with sin-
gle-seat districts "generally" being the appropriate standard for
comparison." 9 Further, in Holder, the Court explored the notion
of a more flexible standard for comparison, explaining that chal-
lenges brought under Section 2 must have an "objective and
workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by which
to evaluate a challenged voting practice," in order to find an inju-
ry. 10 Justice O'Connor, in concurrence, described the use of sin-
gle-seat districts as the alternative to at-large elections as "self-
evident., 21' However, Justice Thomas noted in concurrence that
"there is no principle inherent in our constitutional system, or
even in the history of the Nation's electoral practices, that makes
single-member districts the 'proper' mechanism for electing rep-
resentatives to governmental bodies. 21 2 He further pointed out
that "from the earliest days of the Republic, multimember dis-
tricts were a common feature of our political systems. '
Justice Thomas used this concurrence to criticize the degree to
which the Court was making political judgments, but his argu-
ment for turning to non-winner-take-all systems like choice vot-
ing is compelling.2"4 He described these systems as being able to
"produce proportional results without requiring division of the
electorate into racially segregated districts., 2" He noted that
208. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 909 (Thomas, J., concurring); Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
209. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17 (majority opinion).
210. Holder, 512 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion).
211. Id. at 888 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 897 (Thomas, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 897-98.
214. Id. at 909-10.
215. Id. at 910.
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"nothing in our present understanding of the Voting Rights
Act ... would prevent [states] from instituting a system of cumu-
lative voting as a remedy under § 2, or even from establishing a
more elaborate mechanism for securing proportional representa-
tion based on transferable votes.""2 ' In fact, he pointed out that it
would be difficult for courts "to find a principled reason for hold-
ing that a geographically dispersed minority cannot challenge
districting itself as a dilutive electoral practice," especially be-
cause "cumulative voting and other non-district-based meth-
ods..., are simply more efficient and straight-forward mecha-
nisms for achieving... our tacit objective., 217 Although Justice
Thomas was wrong to suggest that choice voting would necessari-
ly render proportional results by race, he is right that it would of-
ten provide racial minorities the opportunity to elect candidates
of choice more efficiently than majority-minority districts. 8 Jus-
tice Thomas's recognition that the availability of non-district-
based remedies would permit liability for geographically dis-
persed minorities suggests that, at least in his view, geographical
compactness is only required for liability where the plaintiffs seek
district-based remedies." 9
Understanding the compactness criteria in the context of the
remedy sought also makes sense when viewing Section 2 liability
more broadly. Under Section 2, liability may be premised on more
than just the at-large nature of elections.22 For example, it may
be based on a jurisdiction's use of runoff requirements, numbered
posts, or staggered terms. 21 Because the imposition of districts
would not remedy minority vote dilution brought on these bases,
geographical compactness is not an element of liability.222 In a
case with a geographically dispersed minority in a jurisdiction us-
ing winner-take-all, at-large elections, single-member districts
216. Id.
217. Id. at 912.
218. See Drew Spencer & Rob Richie, A Representative Congress: Enhancing African
American Voting Rights in the South with Choice Voting, FAIRVOTE (Nov. 27, 2012), http:/
www.fairvote.org/a-representative-congress-enhancing-african-american-voting-rights-in-
the-south-with-choice-voting.
219. Holder, 512 U.S. at 909.
220. Mulroy, supra note 10, at 365-66.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 365-67 (citing lower court opinions that have not applied compactness as a
precondition to liability).
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would similarly fail to remedy the impermissible vote dilution.223
When non-winner-take-all, at-large voting is the requested reme-
dy, liability is not premised on the fact that the elections are at-
large; rather, liability is premised on the fact that there is racially
polarized voting and the elections are conducted by a method that
is winner-take-all.224 The second and third Gingles factors would
still be relevant, but use of the first would not make sense in such
a claim.
This nonsensical notion-requiring eligibility for one particular
remedy as a precondition liability, even when parties may seek a
different remedy--contributed to California's decision to adopt
the California Voting Rights Act ("CVRA"). 2 5 As the California
Assembly Committee on the Judiciary noted in their analysis of
the bill, "[G]eographical compactness would not appear to be an
important factor in assessing whether the voting rights of a mi-
nority group have been diluted or abridged by an at-large election
system.,,2 2' The availability of a particular remedy should be a
matter for the remedies stage of litigation, not the liability stage.
For the same reason, it does not make sense to premise liability
on the availability of a remedy that the plaintiffs do not seek.
B. Consistency with the Dole Proviso to Section 2
The last two sentences of Section 2 read:
The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance
which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section es-
tablishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
227
223. See id. at 374-75 (illustrating the failure of Section 2 liability preconditioned on
geographic compactness to remedy vote dilution of geographically dispersed minorities).
224. See id.
225. California Voting Rights Act of 2001, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 129 (West)
(codified at CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 14025--32 (West 2003); see ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
2001-2002 REG. SESS., BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 976, at 2-3 (as amended Apr. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 976] (prepared by Kevin G. Baker), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bil/sensb_0951-1000/sb_976_cfa_20020603_131744_a
smcomm.html.
226. BILL ANALYSIS OF S.B. 976, supra note 225, at 3.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
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The last clause is popularly referred to as the Dole proviso, be-
cause it was added in a 1982 amendment sponsored by Senator
Bob Dole.2" The clause restates prior court sentiments that the
VRA does not guarantee proportional representation by race and
ensures that courts will not use Section 2 to enforce a racial quota
on elected bodies.229
Non-winner-take-all elections do not classify anyone by their
status as members of a protected class or by race, much less re-
quire any quota of elected officials to be members of any particu-
lar race. By requiring less than a majority for election, non-
winner-take-all systems allow candidates to be elected roughly in
proportion to the amount of support they receive.2 ° For example,
in a jurisdiction with a five-seat city council in which develop-
ment is a big issue, if 40% of voters favor pro-growth policies and
60% favor slow-growth policies, a non-winner-take-all system will
tend to elect about 40% pro-growth candidates and about 60%
slow-growth candidates. However, these results are not guaran-
teed-it is up to voters to make their decisions and establish their
priorities, and those decisions and priorities may change in any
given election. Similarly, in jurisdictions with racially polarized
voting, non-winner-take-all systems give the racial minority the
opportunity to elect preferred candidates more closely in propor-
tion to their numbers, which is also the goal of districting reme-
dies;23' creation of this opportunity is what makes non-winner-
take-all systems appropriate remedies to racial minority voter di-
lution. However, it in no way guarantees that any number of ra-
cial minority candidates actually will be elected. Election results
depend entirely on which candidates run and what level of sup-
port they receive from voters, with voters free to decide how to
place their support.
228. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 373.
229. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208 ("This dis-
claimer is entirely consistent with the above mentioned Supreme Court and Court of Ap-
peals precedents, which contain similar statements regarding the absence of any right to
proportional representation. It puts to rest any concerns that have been voiced about ra-
cial quotas."); see League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006).
230. See Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 847 F. Supp. 369, 372 (D. Md. 1994) (explaining a
proposed non-winner-take-all system in which a group of 16.7% of voters could elect a can-
didate), affd in part, rev'd in part, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994).
231. See Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1025 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that lack of proportionality is always probative evidence of vote dilution).
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In Cousin v. Sundquist, a case involving vote dilution in judi-
cial elections, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the Dole proviso as
precluding use of the VRA to achieve "proportional representa-
tion."'232 The court stated in dicta that the imposition of cumula-
tive voting would achieve proportional representation and, there-
fore, held that cumulative voting was not available as a remedy,
at least in the context of judicial elections.233
The Sixth Circuit's decision on cumulative voting mixed two
different meanings of the term "proportional representation.""3 4
Non-winner-take-all systems are sometimes referred to as "pro-
portional representation" because they result in legislative bodies
that more accurately reflect their voting populations' preferences,
whatever those may be.23 The Dole proviso merely clarifies that
the VRA does not establish an enforceable right to have members
of a protected class elected in proportion to their numbers in the
population."3 Non-winner-take-all systems do not establish such
racial entitlements; indeed they require no classification by race,
which cannot be said of majority-minority district remedies.237
Even within the flawed logic of the opinion, it is unclear
whether Sundquist's statements applied only to judicial elec-
tions.238 Although some of the opinion's language refers to elec-
tions in general, most of the Sixth Circuit's analysis concerned
only judicial elections."' The opinion also distinguished a contra-
ry case from the District of Maryland merely by pointing out that
that case involved legislative, rather than judicial, elections and
232. 145 F.3d 818, 829-30 (6th Cir. 1998).
233. Id. at 829-31. But see United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740,
752 n.11 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (noting that cumulative voting is an acceptable VRA remedy
notwithstanding the dicta from Sundquist).
234. See Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1899 ('The section 2 proviso does not refer to 'pro-
portionality' in the political science sense of classifying electoral systems.").
235. See Mulroy, supra note 10, at 334 n.1.
236. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 83-84 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Mulroy, supra note 10, at 373-74.
237. See Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 418, 434 (1995) (book review) (noting that majority-minority districts ap-
proximate a quota system much more closely than non-winner-take-all systems).
238. See Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 834.
239. The first paragraph of its remedies analysis concerns the Dole proviso and cumu-
lative voting in general; the second paragraph expresses skepticism that cumulative vot-
ing would actually result in the election of any racial minority judges; the remaining five
paragraphs concern issues specific to judicial elections. Id. at 829-31.
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by noting that the Maryland case had been reversed on other
grounds.24
So far, no case has repeated the flawed reasoning expressed in
dicta in Sundquist. Rather, in the remedy phase of two cases
brought by the Department of Justice since Sundquist, federal
judges have ordered imposition of non-winner-take-all reme-
dies.24 ' A district court ordered implementation of cumulative vot-
ing in Port Chester, New York as a Section 2 remedy.22 Another
district court in the Sixth Circuit noted the continuing acceptabil-
ity of non-winner-take-all remedies, notwithstanding Sundquist,
when ordering implementation of limited voting in Euclid, Ohio.243
Because the Sixth Circuit misapplied the Dole proviso due to con-
fusion over its scope and the effect of non-winner-take-all sys-
tems, other circuits should continue to reject these statements
from Sundquist. The Dole proviso merely prohibits racial quo-
tas;24 it should not be interpreted to bar an entire category of po-
tential remedies that do not classify anyone by race or require the
election of any classes of persons.
C. Consistency with the Shaw Cases
In 1993, the Supreme Court held that the use of race in creat-
ing remedial measures may be unconstitutional racial gerryman-
dering under the Fourteenth Amendment.245 Historically, jurisdic-
tions used racial gerrymandering in order to maximize the
electoral power of the racial majority and to effectively disenfran-
240. Id. at 830 ("[We have discovered only one other district court, in a case involving
not judicial elections but apportionment of the county legislature, that has ordered this
remedy for a Section 2 violation, a disposition subsequently reversed by the Court of Ap-
peals.") (citing Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 847 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1994), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994))). The Fourth Circuit in Cane reversed because the dis-
trict court failed to defer to the defendant jurisdiction's choice of remedies, and expressly
declined "to outline whether facts and circumstances might justify the imposition of a cu-
mulative voting plan on a political subdivision," because that question was not before it.
Cane, 35 F.3d at 928.
241. See United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 453 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 752 n.11.
242. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
243. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d at 752 n.il.
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006); supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
245. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
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chise racial minorities.21 6 The VRA was passed, in part, to put an
end to this sort of racial gerrymandering. 47 However, the Court's
Equal Protection jurisprudence applies strict scrutiny in any case
involving a race-based classification, irrespective of whether the
classification serves a remedial purpose.4 8 Consequently, to the
extent a remedy to a VRA case classifies individuals by race, it
will be subject to strict scrutiny and likely will be found unconsti-
tutional.2"9
If a jurisdiction purposefully uses race as a "predominant fac-
tor" in drawing single-member district boundaries, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels courts to
review the electoral scheme under strict scrutiny.2 ° This remains
true even if the racial majority has not suffered any voting dilu-
tion as a result of the redistricting.251 Furthermore, the Court
seems to be treating majority-minority districts with greater
Equal Protection scrutiny as more cases come before it.252 Conse-
quently, the use of single-member districts as a remedy to VRA
cases has become tenuous.
As Shaw itself recognized, at-large and multi-member electoral
systems do not classify anyone by race at all.253 At-large or multi-
member choice voting elections guarantee that minority view-
points have the opportunity to achieve representation.2" They do
not require drawing lines around particular individuals or con-
sidering.the race of any particular individuals.255 Choice voting
does not rely on any racial stereotypes or balkanize racial groups
by putting them into racially defined districts.256 By using choice
voting, jurisdictions can avoid the segregating effects single-
246. Id. at 639-40.
247. See id. at 641.
248. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
249. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 653.
250. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915-16 (1995).
251. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649-50.
252. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241, 258 (2001); Miller, 515 U.S. at
916.
253. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649 ("At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not clas-
sify voters on the basis of race.").
254. See supra Section II.
255. Id.
256. See Mulroy, supra note 14, at 1912 (noting that choice voting helps create cross-
racial coalitions that act as "anti-balkanizers").
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member districts create and can avoid strict scrutiny review of
their efforts to remedy to racial vote dilution. 57
D. Use in Settlements or When Preferred by the Defendant
Non-winner-take-all voting systems have been used as judicial-
ly imposed remedies for Section 2 violations. 258 As mentioned ear-
lier, Justice Thomas has expressed the opinion that a court can
order choice voting as a remedy to such a violation.59 Justice
O'Connor expressed a similar opinion in her dissent to Branch v.
Smith.26 However, many courts have expressed a preference for
the use of single-seat districts when fashioning a remedy, typical-
ly without consideration of non-winner-take-all methods unless
the jurisdiction specifically requests districts rather than a non-
winner-take-all method.261 Both courts and jurisdictions should
reconsider this preference in light of the benefits of choice voting
as a remedy.262 Furthermore, remedies in Section 2 cases need not
be imposed by a court. Often, the parties reach a settlement
wherein the defendant jurisdiction voluntarily alters its elections
method;263 courts have sanctioned the use of non-winner-take-all
voting systems in these settlements.64
257. See Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Federal Voting Rights Act and Alternative Election
Systems, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 645 (1978).
258. Cottier v. City of Martin, 475 F. Supp. 2d 932, 942-43 (D.S.D. 2007), vacated en
banc, 604 F.3d 553 (8th Cir. 2010). The court's decision on liability was reversed on ap-
peal, with the court of appeals declining to decide the issue of remedies. Cottier v. City of
Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 562 (8th Cir. 2010) (en banc) ("[W]e need not consider ... any reme-
dies proposed by the plaintiffs.").
259. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 910 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
260. 538 U.S. 254, 309-10 (2003) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
261. E.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
333 (1973). But cf. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 42 (1982) (per curiam) (citing Whit-
comb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-61 (1971) (preserving a jurisdiction's valid use of at-
large elections)).
262. See generally Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative
Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 781, 807 (1993).
263. See e.g., United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 453 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); Docket at 11-12, Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.2d 469 (8th Cir.
1986) (No. 84-1025), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocslnot_
public/VR-SD-0021-9001.pdf.
264. E.g., Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 453; Dillard v. Chilton Cnty.
Comm'n, 699 F. Supp 870, 875-76 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
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Even where no settlement can be reached, the first choice of
remedies goes to the defendant jurisdiction.265 Based on a policy of
allowing jurisdictions the freedom to choose their own methods of
election, courts will defer to a defendant's appropriate choice of
remedy even if the court itself would prefer some other remedy.
266
To be appropriate, a proposed remedy need only comply with fed-
eral law, including the VRA and the U.S. Constitution.267 For ex-
ample, when the city of Port Chester, New York was found liable
for a violation of Section 2, it requested a non-winner-take-all
system of elections as a remedy.2 68 This choice was respected by
the presiding judge, who then imposed it as a remedy.269
Jurisdictions subject to VRA liability should consider choice
voting as a preferred remedy in settlement or in final judgment.
Doing so would enable them to maintain the at-large or multi-
member nature of their elections.27° As a race neutral solution, it
would also protect them from future litigation on equal protection
grounds and avoid the need for decennial redistricting that could
result in further litigation.271 Both plaintiffs and defendants
should be ready to ask for choice voting, both as an effective rem-
edy and as a remedy that is not reliant on how districts might be
drawn in the future, possibly in the absence of Section 5 preclear-
ance authority.
E. State Voting Rights Acts
Currently, California is the only state to have enacted its own
version of the VRA.272 However, a state voting rights act has gar-
265. See Upham, 456 U.S. at 41-42 (quoting White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95
(1973)); Cottier v. City of Martin, 445 F.3d 1113, 1123 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated en banc,
604 F.3d 553 (8th Cir. 2010); E. Jefferson Coal. for Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of
Jefferson, 926 F.2d 487, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1991); Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at
448; United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744-45 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
266. Upham, 456 U.S. at 40-41.
267. Id. at 42 (citing White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973)).
268. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 416.
269. Id. at 453.
270. See id.; Engstrom, supra note 262, at 788 (stating that single transferable voting
is a preferred voting system for multi-seat elections).
271. See Engstrom, supra note 262, at 791, 807.
272. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 14025-32 (West 2003). Illinois has also adopted a law titled
the Illinois Voting Rights Act, but it merely requires the use of majority- minority districts,
crossover districts, and influence districts whenever redistricting takes place, rather than
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nered support in Washington.7 3 Enacting a state voting rights act
allows states to have racial vote dilution claims brought in state
court, and, if crafted to be inclusive of non-winner-take-all reme-
dies, to tailor the standards for liability and remedies to the
states' own preferences. '74
The CVRA improves upon the federal VRA by explicitly omit-
ting the requirement that the racial minority be geographically
compact, explicitly opening the door to non-winner-take-all voting
systems, at the very least when there is no such geographic com-
pactness.275 Although no California court has yet imposed a non-
winner-take-all voting system, one has noted the possibility with-
out criticism."'
Unfortunately, the CVRA explicitly only allows liability for at-
large systems, without qualification, while leaving single-member
district systems unaddressed.277 Because of this, jurisdictions in
California often adopt single-member district elections, not be-
cause they necessarily see them as better, but because doing so
effectively grants them immunity under the CVRA and ensures
that no liability will follow in state court.27 s The CVRA also sug-
gests the use of single-member districts as remedies, but does not
foreclose the use of modified, at-large remedies.279
States interested in adopting their own voting rights acts
should adapt the CVRA model. It has been effective in helping
providing a cause of action for racial minority vote dilution. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
12015-1 to 15-10 (West 2012).
273. H.B. 2612, 62d Leg., 2012 Sess. (Wash. 2012); S.B. 6381, 62d Leg., 2012 Sess.
(Wash. 2012).
274. See, e.g., Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 828 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
275. See id. (noting plaintiffs argument that in the absence of a compactness require-
ment, courts could impose modified, at-large remedies).
276. See id. at 829, 843.
277. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14027 ("An at-large method of election may not be imposed or
applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its
choice."). No such prohibition exists for district systems. See id. §§ 14025-32.
278. Cf. Memorandum from Jeffrey R. Epp & Jennifer K. McCain to the Honorable
Mayor and Members of the City Council of Escondido (May 23, 2012), available at
http://www.escondido.orglData/Sites/l/media/PDFs/CCStaffReportO52312.pdf ("Cumula-
tive voting is still considered at-large voting, however, and its implementation would not
prevent future challenges based on the California Voting Rights Act.").
279. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14029 ("[The court shall implement appropriate remedies, in-
cluding the imposition of district-based elections, that are tailored to remedy the viola-
tion.").
20131
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
many jurisdictions with racially polarized voting move to more
inclusive systems without the need to go to federal court. 20 But
any new state voting rights acts should explicitly establish the le-
gality of non-winner-take-all systems such as like choice voting
and should permit liability for any systems that result in racial
minority vote dilution. These modifications would avoid incentiv-
izing jurisdictions to use only single-member districts.
IV. CHOICE VOTING FOR CONGRESS AND THE STATES
The application of choice voting to state legislative elections
and congressional elections should generally take the form of
multi-member districts composed of between three and five mem-
bers each.28' For states, this may require a change to the state
constitution specifying how one or both bodies is elected.282 For
the U.S. House, it would require only statutory changes and state
action, as the U.S. Constitution does not specify how states must
assign their congressional delegations, and many states histori-
cally did not use single-member districts.283 In either case, choice
voting in multi-member districts represents a constitutional
method of breaking the polarizing deadlock of single-seat districts
and of achieving a body that fairly represents its constituents.
A. Why Choice Voting in Multi-Member Districts Should Be Used
The U.S. House has reached a remarkable level of partisan po-
larization--one that also has a decided tilt toward one political
party, in violation of the principles of representative democracy.284
In November 2012, for example, not a single one of the 177 most
Democratic and 177 most Republican districts elected a new
280. See Kareem V. Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REV.
201, 240 (2010).
281. FairVote's website includes an interactive map demonstrating how such districts
could be drawn for U.S. congressional seats in all fifty states. The Fair Voting Solution for
U.S. House Elections, FAIRVOTE, http:l/www.fairvote.org/fair-voting-solution#.UKvmNu
SA5cl (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
282. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
283. The Constitution only requires that representatives be chosen "by the People of
the several States." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. States have used at-large and multi-member
elections in the past. See supra Section II.
284. McCarthy, supra note 89.
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member from that district's minority party. s5 Districts that only
narrowly lean toward one party become virtually out of reach for
the minority party absent a strong national tide.2"6 The result is
an utter lack of competition in most districts, with average victo-
ry margins regularly more than two-to-one, and an unrepresenta-
tive division of the nation into Republican Red and Democratic
Blue-a distorted reflection of the actual balance of political opin-
ion that would more accurately translate into different shades of
purple. 287 Furthermore, partisan bias toward one major party is
grounded in the fact that Democrats disproportionately live in
concentrated urban areas, thereby having an inefficient distribu-
tion of their voting constituents.2 "' Inefficient distribution is likely
to sustain this bias for the foreseeable future, now that neither
party is showing the ability to win in districts leaning toward the
other party.289 FairVote's analysis suggests that Democratic can-
didates for the U.S. House in 2012 likely needed to be preferred
by more than 54% of voters to win even a slim majority. 2 ° Fur-
thermore, women candidates once again won relatively few races
and in 2013 will hold only 18% of U.S. House seats. 91
History suggests the value of choice voting to confront these
problems. In the mid-nineteenth century, Illinois suffered from
severe partisan polarization between the northern half of the
state, largely controlled by Republicans, and the southern half,
largely controlled by Democrats-a situation that resulted in
gridlock and corruption.292 In 1870, when the state convened a
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. See Mark Newman, Maps of the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election Results, http://
www-personal.umich.edu/-mejn/election/2012/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
288. Rob Richie & Devin McCarthy, FairVote's Unique Methodology Shows That 52%
of Voters Wanted a Democratic House, FAIRVOTE (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/
fairvote-s-unique-methodology-shows-that-52-of-voters-wanted-a-democratic-house/.
289. See Micah Cohen, The 2012 Election, In a Relative Sense, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT BLOG,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/
19/the-2012-election-in-a-relative-sense/.
290. Rob Richie, Clashing Mandates and the Role of Voting Structures, FAIRVOTE (Nov.
20, 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/clashing-mandates-and-the-role-of-voting-structures/.
291. See Patricia Hart, Gains for Women in Senate Help Make Our Case for Representa-
tion 2020, FAIRVOTE (Nov. 8, 2012), http:lwww.fairvote.org/gains-for-women-in-senate-
help-make-our-case-for-representation-202/; supra note 112 and accompanying text.
292. UNIV. OF ILL., INST. OF GOV'T & PUB. AFFAIRS, ILLINOIS ASSEMBLY ON POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION AND ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15 (2001),
available at http://archive.fairvote.org/op-ed sexecsum.pdf.
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Constitutional Convention, it found a solution to the problem by
changing its house of representatives to a body elected in multi-
member, three-seat districts, each of which was elected by cumu-
lative voting.293 The result, according to a 2001 commission re-
port, was more proportional representation by party, more candi-
date independence from party leaders, and better efforts at
statewide consensus-all values that speak well to many Ameri-
cans' concerns about Congress today.
294
FairVote has simulated the likely results of congressional elec-
tions for the U.S. House held in multi-member districts that use
choice voting ("Fair Voting Plans").295 Under FairVote's proposed
system, states would use choice voting to elect between three and
five representatives from each district. The result is a U.S. House
in which every district in every region elects at least one Republi-
can and one Democrat, reliably reflecting the left, right, and cen-
ter of each district, and ending the locked-in, safe district races
and party polarization characteristic of single-member districts. 96
Use of choice voting under a Fair Voting Plan would likely
mean greater electoral opportunities for the moderate Democrats
and Republicans who fare so poorly in modern elections, especial-
ly in the South. In Louisiana, for example, instead of the recur-
ring pattern of polarization by race and party in six single-
member districts, five of which safely elect conservative Republi-
cans with the sixth safely electing a liberal Democrat, the state
would have two multi-member districts electing three representa-
tives each. 97 Each third of the electorate would have the power to
293. See id.
294. See id. Illinois rescinded the use of this system through an initiative titled the
"Cutback Amendment" which was largely advertised as an effort to reduce the size of the
legislature by one-third. Id. at 16-17. The commission was headed by former Republican
Governor Jim Edgar and former Federal Judge Abner Mikva, and the report recommended
that Illinois restore non-winner-take-all voting for its House elections. Id. at 5, 12-13 (cit-
ing the benefits of cumulative voting previously seen, as well as greater voter choice and
easier access by candidates).
295. Fair Voting 2012, FAIRVOTE, http://www.fairvote.orgtfair-voting-2012#.UKvlaeSA
5cO (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
296. See id. Every district electing at least three members has shared representation;
states only allowed one or two representatives do not. See United States Redistricting &
the Fair Voting Alternative, FAERVOTE (Oct. 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/assetsl2012-Re
districting/USAFairVotingOnePager.pdf.
297. 2011 Redistricting and 2012 Elections in Louisiana, FAIRVOTE (Sept. 2012), http:
//www.fairvote.orglassets/2012-Redistricting/. Although FairVote has generally used exist-
1004 [Vol. 47:959
CHOICE VOTING
elect a candidate of choice. With African Americans above the
threshold of exclusion in both districts, the state would likely
elect two preferred African American Democratic candidates, two
traditional Republicans, and two candidates reflective of the re-
maining voters-likely more moderate Republicans able to earn
the support of centrist Democrats. 298 The result would be a far
more accurate reflection of the state.
Similarly, the Massachusetts Fair Voting Plan would create
three districts, each with three seats.299 It would likely result in
three Republican wins in a state that has not elected a Republi-
can to the U.S. House since 1994, yet still give a clear majority of
six seats to Democratic candidates."0 As a group, these legislators
would more accurately reflect the diversity of opinion within the
state's Democratic voters.
Nationally, these Fair Voting Plans eliminate the partisan
skew that currently tilts the electoral playing field in U.S. House
elections. Although in constructing the plans FairVote focused on-
ly on developing a sensible plan for each state individually, the
aggregate totals are revealing. Currently, there are 195 districts
that are at least 54% Republican, as compared to only 166 district
that are least 54% Democratic."' The Fair Voting Plans result in
a nearly even divide in relatively safe seats for each party, mak-
ing it much more likely that any party with a national majority
preference would earn a majority of seats."0
From a perspective of minority voting rights, these fair voting
plans would have a remarkable impact. For example, in the five
ing district maps and simply erased lines to create multi-member districts, they did create
a fair voting multi-member district map for Louisiana from scratch as a demonstration.
Creating a "Perfect" Fair Voting Plan, FAiRVOTE (Oct. 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/as
sets/2012-Redistricting/CreatingLouisianaPlanFromScratch.pdf.
298. Creating a "Perfect" Fair Voting Plan, FAIRVOTE, supra note 297.
299. 2011 Redistricting and 2012 Elections in Massachusetts, FAIRVOTE (Oct. 2012),
http://www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-Redistricting/MARedistrictingAnalysis.pdf.
300. Id.; see BIOGRAPHICAL DIR. OF THE U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.govfbio
searchlbiosearchl.asp (search "Representative" for "Position," 'Massachusetts" for "State,"
and "Republican" for 'Party") (showing the last Republicans' terms ending in 1996) (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013).
301. See Fair Voting Plans Vs. Current House Districts: United States Analysis,
FAIRVOTE (Oct. 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-RedistrictingfUSAStateParti
sanshipComparison.pdf.
302. Id.
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southern states running from North Carolina through South Car-
olina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, our proposed fair vot-
ing plans put African Americans over or very close to the thresh-
old of exclusion in every multi-seat district in every state.303 Not
only would that likely increase the number of candidates elected
with strong African American support from ten to fourteen, but it
would also put every single African American voter in these
states in a position to elect candidates of choice, more than dou-
bling the number from the current district plans."4 It would do
this while maintaining the ability of every white voter to elect
candidates of choice and every African American Republican to
help elect a like-minded candidate as well. 5
ENHANCING AFRICAN AMERICAN VOTING RIGHTS
WITH CHOICE VOTING
30 6
State• ... [' G [South I North
State Louisiana Mississippi labama Georga Carolina Carolina
iSeats/Superdistricts 6/2 f 4/1 [ 7/2 1 14/4 1 7/2 13/3
Majority-minority 1 1 1 ..1.1.t 2
Districts (Currently)
* Candidates of 1 I
,Choice Under Choice 2 1 2 4 2 3Voting
I African AmericanVoting Strength* 32% 43% 35% 0:; 10% 19'
S (Currently)
African American IiVoting Strength* 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Under Choice VotingI
• Measures percentage of African Americans living in district where power to
elect a preferred candidate under conditions of racially polarized voting
This enhanced power can also be true in parts of other states.
For example, five white-majority districts lie on the eastern edge
of Texas; combining these districts into a single super district us-
ing choice voting would permit the election of a racial minority
candidate of choice.0 7 In much of this region, African Americans
303. See Spencer & Richie, supra note 218.
304. See id.
305. See id.
306. Id.
307. Id.; 2011-2012 Redistricting and Elections in Texas, FAIRVOTE (Sept. 2012), http://
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make up a sufficient proportion of the population to earn greater
legislative representation, but they are not geographically segre-
gated enough to be drawn into majority-minority districts, mak-
ing a proportional system the only option for breaking past their
current ceiling.
Even in racially polarized states with a population of racial mi-
norities insufficient to gain actual representation, choice voting
would guarantee that racial minorities could influence the out-
come in a meaningful way. For example, in Arkansas, every con-
gressional district has over 70% white voting population.0 9 Given
that each representative is elected on a winner-take-all basis, it is
not surprising that in 2012 every one of its four districts elected a
white Republican. With choice voting, racial minorities still would
not compose enough of Arkansas' population to elect a candidate
of choice with their votes alone, but choice voting gives voters the
power to indicate backup choices who can receive your vote if
your first choice is defeated.31° African American Democrats would
have sufficient numbers to influence elections by joining in cross-
racial coalitions of voters able to elect at least one candidate more
reflective of their policy preferences.'
Choice voting also addresses one of the uncomfortable realities
of courts ordering states and jurisdictions to use single-member
districts: more women run and win with multi-member dis-
tricts. 12 Today nine in ten southern districts are represented by
www.fairvote.org/assets/2012-Redistricting/TXRedistrictingAnalysis.pdf (Super-District
F).
308. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at
11 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.census,gov/prodlcen20lObriefs/c2OlObr-06.pdf.
309. See 2010 Census Interactive Population Search, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/2OlOcensus/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=o1 (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (show-
ing that each of Arkansas's four congressional districts had over 70% white voting popula-
tion).
310. Mulroy, supra note 10, at 341-42.
311. See id.; Rob Richie, Rigging Democracy, 37 INST. FOR PUB. AFF. 18, 18-20 (2013);
cf. Ruy Teixiera & John Halpin, The Return of the Obama Coalition: A Demographic Anal-
ysis of Election 2012 Results, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.ameri
canprogress.org/presstrelease/2012/11/08/44388/release-the-return-of-the-obama-coalition-
a-demographic-analysis-of-election-2012-results/ (discussing the demographics of Presi-
dent Obama's coalition in the 2012 election).
312. See generally Wilma Rule, Multimember Legislative Districts: Minority and Anglo
Women's and Men's Recruitment Opportunity, in UNITED STATES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS,
supra note 181, at 57, 67 (concluding that multi-member districts are best for women).
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men, and nearly one in six around the nation.1 3 Research on
women's representation shows that when parties nominate more
than one candidate in multi-member districts, more women tend
to earn nominations and win office. 314 Traditional winner-take-all
district remedies provide a tradeoff between allowing some racial
minority representation while limiting opportunities for women."'Fair voting maximizes electoral opportunities for both.
At a time when jurisdictions seem open to reform, but frustrat-
ed with disappointing results, fair voting may have an opening to
be tried by states.316 Most obstacles to achieving such a result, ei-
ther at the state or federal level, are political. 37 However, there
are certain significant legal questions that arise under any new
election system. The rest of this Section demonstrates that both
Congress and the states could adopt multi-member legislative
elections by choice voting without running afoul of the "one per-
son, one vote" doctrine. It further considers the states in which
choice voting has been deemed unconstitutional, noting that these
decisions are no longer legally binding and should not be followed.
Finally, it calls for repeal of the 1967 law requiring that the U.S.
House be elected exclusively from single-member districts, ideally
twinned with establishment of independent redistricting commis-
sions, which would be tasked with creating Fair Voting Plans.
B. One Person, One Vote
In 1964, the Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that the United
States Constitution guarantees that both federal and state legis-
lative districts must be apportioned equally by population.31 s It
313. Women in State Legislatures: 2012 Legislative Session, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/win/wo
men-in-state-legislatures-2012.aspx.
314. R. Darcy, Electoral Barriers to Women, in UNITED STATES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS,
supra note 181, at 221, 228.
315. See generally Rule, supra note 312, at 62, 64-65.
316. See, e.g., Andrew Spencer, Note, Cleaning Elections, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 277, 287-88
(2012) (noting the limitations of traditional campaign finance reform); Steven Hill, Cali-
fornia Electoral Reform Fails Its First Test, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 16, 2012, at A17 (not-
ing disappointment with California's attempts at independent redistricting and the "top
two" system).
317. See infra note 328 and accompanying text.
318. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) ("[Tlhe Equal Protection Clause
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described this requirement as "one person, one vote," though that
definition is misleading in that the Court required representa-
tives to have an equal number of constituents, not an equal num-
ber of eligible voters."' These cases mandate that states draw
single-member districts such that each contains an approximately
equal number of persons, as of the last census, or multi-member
districts such that each has an equal ratio of persons to repre-
sentatives.32°
This specific mandate falls well short of equal voting power. It
fails to take into account variable turnout rates between districts,
proportions of disenfranchised persons living in the districts, and
mobility among districts between census years.321 The mandate
did improve equality of voting power by forbidding states from
creating some districts with very low populations and some with
very large populations.322 However, no rule could guarantee equal
voting power among everyone within the paradigm of winner-
take-all elections.
The use of choice voting complies with the "one person, one
vote" constitutional requirement so long as each fair voting dis-
trict contains the same number of persons per representative.
Even though some districts may have greater populations than
others, each person will have the same influence in the election in
terms of voting strength. 23 When elections are done at-large, usu-
requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned
on a population basis."); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964) (noting that the Con-
stitution guarantees roughly "equal representation for equal numbers of people").
319. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); see White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 754,
764, 766 (1973). For example, voters in multi-member districts may have more votes than
voters in single-seat districts without violating the "one person, one vote" principle. See
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142-43 (1971) (noting that the combined use of multi-
member and single-seat districts does not violate equal protection concerns).
320. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 142-43. ('That voters in multi-member districts vote
for and are represented by more legislators than voters in single-member districts has so
far not demonstrated an invidious discrimination against the latter.").
321. For instance, the mandate has thus far failed to put an end to the practice of
"prison-based gerrymandering," wherein a rural jurisdiction containing a prison receives
elevated representation due to its prison population, notwithstanding that the prisoners
may not have the legal right to vote. See generally Peter Wagner, Breaking the Census:
Redistricting in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1241, 1242-45
(2012) (discussing the concept and effect of prison-based gerrymandering).
322. See generally Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 3 (noting that one district's population was
"grossly out of balance").
323. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 142-43.
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ally in smaller jurisdictions, the mandate does not even apply, as
it only refers to districts."4
In fact, choice voting furthers the goals of the Court's mandate
much better than single-member districts. By putting multiple
candidates within a single, larger legislative district, choice vot-
ing plans guarantee that within those districts, each candidate
will compete for exactly the same threshold of votes and, ulti-
mately, represent almost exactly the same number of voters. If
turnout rates or population demographics change, the number of
seats available can be adjusted without redistricting, and the
threshold will adapt, as it is based entirely on the number of
seats available.
C. Constitutionality of Choice Voting in States
In the early twentieth century, a number of jurisdictions
throughout the U.S. adopted choice voting, mainly for city council
and other local positions. 29 These included nearly two-dozen cit-
ies, including Cleveland, Cincinnati, Sacramento, and, at a time
when the city's population was larger than most states, New York
City.26 From those cities, only Cambridge, Massachusetts has re-
tained the system to the present day.327 Most repealed choice vot-
ing for political reasons, motivated by discomfort with the election
of racial or political minorities.32 Political parties largely opposed
it as it took away the control they had previously held over party
nominations.32 s But in a few states, the system was held unconsti-
tutional by state courts. 30
Several states' constitutions contained a provision guarantee-
ing to voters the right to vote for all offices in their districts or ju-
324. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 574 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting) (noting
that the use of at-large elections "gives all the people an equally effective voice in electing
their representatives").
325. Reyes, supra note 154, at 674-76 (reviewing the history of the use of the single
transferable vote in U.S. cities).
326. Id. at 674 & n.144.
327. Id. at 675.
328. New York City, for example, repealed the system after the successful election of
some representatives from the Communist Party. Reyes, supra note 154, at 675 & n.158.
329. Id. at 675.
330. See, e.g., Devine v. Elkus, 211 P. 34, 39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922); Wattles v. Upjohn,
179 N.W. 335, 342 (Mich. 1920); Brown v. Smallwood, 153 N.W. 953, 957 (Minn. 1915).
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risdictions."' These provisions forbade localities from establishing
different classifications of voters based on some characteristic. 32
For example, these provisions would forbid limiting school board
elections to only those who have children. However, when cities
within some of these states adopted choice voting, an argument
was made that the choice voting system itself violates the provi-
sion." The plaintiffs argued that in an at-large election, every
seat to be filled is a different office.334 Consequently, to allow vot-
ers to vote for every office requires that all voters be able to cast a
number of votes equal to the number of offices to be filled; in oth-
er words, the provision requires that all at-large elections be held
by the winner-take-all, general ticket method. 35
Courts in Ohio, Massachusetts, and New York explicitly reject-
ed these challenges3 . while courts in Michigan and California ac-
cepted them,337 and the Rhode Island Supreme Court followed suit
in an advisory opinion.3 The constitutional language the Califor-
nia court interpreted has since been removed from the California
Constitution, as has the language from the Michigan Constitu-
tion, so those cases have been effectively superseded, rendering
them irrelevant. 39 Elections at the time had a different character,
with winner-take-all, at-large elections still having some degree
331. In Ohio, the relevant provision stated that every elector was "entitled to vote at all
elections." Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 141 N.E. 27, 32 (Ohio 1923). In Massachusetts, it
stated that all electors "have an equal right to elect officers." Moore v. Election Comm'rs of
Cambridge, 35 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Mass. 1941). In Michigan, it stated that each elector
"shall be entitled to vote at all elections." Wattles, 179 N.W. at 341. In New York, it stated
that each elector "shall be entitled to vote at such election in the election district of which
he or she shall at the time be a resident ... for all officers that now are or hereafter may
be elective by the people." Johnson v. City of New York, 9 N.E.2d 30, 33 (N.Y. 1937). In
California, it stated that every qualified elector "shall be entitled to vote at all elections
which are now or may hereafter be authorized by law." Devine, 211 P. at 35. The Rhode
Island Constitution gave all electors "a right to vote in the election of all civil officers." Op.
to the Gov., 6 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 1939).
332. See supra note 331.
333. See, e.g., Devine, 211 P. at 39.
334. See, e.g., id. at 35 ('The election of nine members of the city council is the election
of persons to nine offices ... ").
335. See Op. to the Gov., 6 A.2d at 150 ("[T]he act accords to the elector only one effec-
tive vote for only one such councilman. Manifestly there are eight other elective officers
under the act, in the election of whom the electors are deprived of a vote.").
336. Moore, 35 N.E.2d at 241; Johnson, 9 N.E.2d at 38; Reutener, 141 N.E. at 32-34.
337. Devine, 211 P. at 39; Wattles v. Upjohn, 179 N.W. 335, 342 (Mich. 1920).
338. Op. to the Gov., 6 A.2d at 149, 153.
339. See MICH. CONST. art. II; CAL. CONST. art. II.
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of support in local jurisdictions.3 4' Given the degree to which law
has changed since the early twentieth century, modern courts are
likely to avoid the errors of these early opinions. Indeed, the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court unanimously rejected a challenge to
choice voting in 1996, as did the Minnesota Supreme Court in
2009.3
4
'
D. Federal Mandate for Single-Seat Congressional Elections
As mentioned in Section I of this article, Congress first passed
a mandate that every state elect its congressional delegation from
single-seat districts in 1842.342 However, this mandate often went
unenforced and officially lapsed when the 1929 reapportionment
law did not affirm it.343 In 1967, Congress reimplemented this
mandate based on fears that Supreme Court redistricting juris-
prudence would lead states to adopt at-large, winner-take-all
elections.344 Congress was also motivated by concerns over the ef-
fects such elections would have on racial minorities and civil
rights-in other words, Congress sought to protect diversity of
representation, not to prohibit it.
345
However, now that Section 2 forbids states from adopting elec-
toral methods that would diminish the relative voting power of
racial minorities, those concerns are largely addressed by federal
law.3 46 Any state adopting at-large or multi-member systems for
its congressional election likely would have to use some non-
winner-take-all method-ideally choice voting-in order to avoid
Section 2 liability.
3 47
Underscoring this point is congressional testimony from 1999,
when Representative Melvin L. Watt of North Carolina intro-
duced the States' Choice of Voting Systems Act, which would
340. See Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
341. McSweeney v. City of Cambridge, 665 N.E.2d 11, 17 (Mass. 1996); Minn. Voters
Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683, 698 (Minn. 2009).
342. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
343. See Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 8 (1932).
344. Flores, supra note 2, at ch. 4.
345. Id.
346. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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have repealed the 1967 single-member district mandate.34 During
the congressional hearings on the bill, Anita Hodgkiss gave tes-
timony on behalf of the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Divi-
sion, to the effect that allowing states to elect their congressional
delegations through multi-member districts would not have a di-
luting effect on the votes of racial minorities so long as those
states had to conduct their elections in a way consistent with the
VRA.
349
Furthermore, as FairVote has noted, Congress could require
that states use choice voting along with multi-member districts,
just as they required winner-take-all, single-seat elections in
1967.3' 0 The best vehicle would be to adapt legislation, such as the
John Tanner Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act,
351
to establish independent redistricting commissions, which could
create Fair Voting Plans for choice voting elections in districts
with between three and five seats. Given the current political cri-
sis of party polarization, often with a racial dimension, the un-
derrepresentation of women, the lack of competition in single-
member districts, and the distorted partisan representation of
those districts, Congress would have strong incentives to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
The promise of a U.S. House serving as a "mirror of the people"
has remained out of grasp, and state and local bodies have not
fared much better.35 The shift from winner-take-all, at-large, and
multi-member elections to single-seat districts succeeded in
avoiding slate elections for huge areas.35' However, the use of the
single-seat district as a talisman has come at a cost. It should be
revisited both by courts that have wrongly focused only on single-
member districts as voting rights remedies, jurisdictions required
348. See States' Choice of Voting Systems Act, H.R. 1173, 106th Cong. (1999).
349. See States' Choice of Voting Systems Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 48 (1999) (statement of Anita
Hodgkiss, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice).
350. The Law and Fair Voting for Congress: Five Questions Grounded in American His-
tory and Law, FAIRVOTE (Oct. 2012), available at http:lwww.fairvote.org/assets/2012-
Redistricting/FairVotingLawFiveQuestions.pdf.
351. H.R. 278, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
352. See supra Section I.C.
353. See supra Section I.
2013] CHOICE VOTING 1013
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
by law to change their winner-take-all systems, and policymakers
structuring our voting rules.
As racial polarization remains an enduring feature of American
elections, as women continue to hold fewer than 20% of congres-
sional seats and fewer than 25% of state legislature seats, and as
party polarization plagues civic activities resulting in gridlock
and cynicism, reformers should look to alternatives for some
hope.354 Scholars of political science have long suggested fair vot-
ing systems such as choice voting as just such an alternative.355
Organizations like FairVote continue to suggest concrete exam-
ples of how these reforms could be put into action in ways that
are modest, constitutional, and distinctly American.
However, legal roadblocks remain in the way. Judges and law-
yers must be willing to see beyond the use of single-seat districts
when interpreting legislation that requires minority representa-
tion, such as the VRA. Legal scholars can lead the way in propos-
ing new legislation and legal paradigms, such as state Voting
Rights Acts and novel legal theories leading toward more flexibil-
ity in choice of election system. Legislators must look beyond the
electoral system in which they themselves have had to work in
order to achieve a legislative body that will break up the patterns
of polarization and better represent the left, right, and middle of
their jurisdictions.
As John Stuart Mill said in advocating choice voting in 1861,
"It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be ad-
equately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false
show of democracy, is possible without it."35 Choice voting,
though still unfamiliar to many outside of those already interest-
ed in electoral reform, has an illustrious history in the United
States. We expect it will have an even more illustrious future.
354. See supra Section I.
355. See generally Briffault, supra note 237 (reviewing the career of Lani Guinier in
advocating for proportional systems to promote racial minority representation); Engstrom,
supra note 262 (recommending the single transferable vote as an alternative remedy for
minority vote dilution).
356. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 137-38
(1861).
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